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Summary 
This paper reviews the literature for a project which seeks to develop a new Green 
Growth Diagnostics methodology and apply it to countries in Africa. 
 
The original growth diagnostics methodology was developed by Haussmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco to identify the key constraints holding back economic growth from its full 
potential. Their approach was driven by the needs of policymakers facing the dilemma 
that most problems have multiple causes, but governments cannot tackle all of them at 
once, given limitations in their financial and executive capacity. This gave rise to the idea 
of concentrating these limited resources on the binding constraint, which would be 
identified going through a tool conceptualised as a decision tree. The proponents of the 
original growth diagnostics also realised that this binding constraint varies between 
countries and - we would argue - between sectors. 
 
The central point of the original growth diagnostics method was that it offered researchers 
and policy makers a way of identifying priorities in analysis and policy; and finding 
solutions which take into account local conditions. The same rationale applies to our 
Green Growth Diagnostic project. We build on the original approach but adapt it in four 
ways: 1. Applying it to the energy sector; 2. Taking into account potential knock-on effects 
on the economy; 3. The political economy when going from diagnostics to therapeutics; 
and 4. Working out the distributional consequences. Since each step takes the project 
into un(der)explored territory, it is built around five research questions and corresponding 
methodologically distinct work packages. 
 
Our five research questions are: 1. What are the binding constraints for investment in 
economically viable renewable energy?; 2.Which policies can more effectively target 
different binding constraints?; 3. Who obstructs/drives the adoption of specific sustainable 
energy policies?; 4. What would be the macroeconomic impacts of an increase in 
renewable energy investment/capacity, and the reforms needed to bring this increase 
about? and 5. Under what circumstances increased on-grid renewable energy capacity 
translates into increased access to and increased reliability of electricity supply in 
developing countries? This paper pulls together what we can learn from the international 
literature on these questions. 
 
Key words: Green Growth, green growth diagnostics, renewable energy, sustainable 
energy, green electricity, green power, low carbon growth.  
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Introduction and objectives 
This literature review represents the first stage of the EPSRC-funded research project 
‘Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa’ (GGDA). The project seeks to unravel what is 
holding back investment in promising renewable energy technologies through the 
development of a methodology to identify the ‘binding constraint’ to this investment. The 
methodology will be piloted in two countries – Kenya and Ghana – and refined in the light 
of the results. Subsequently, we hope it will be applied more broadly in Africa and beyond. 
The research will address five questions: 
 
1. What are the binding constraints to investment in economically and financially 
viable renewable energy that would promote inclusive green growth? 
2. Which policies could most effectively remove these constraints? 
3. Who obstructs/drives the adoption of these policies?’ 
4. What would be the macroeconomic impacts of an increase in renewable energy 
investment/capacity, and the implementation of reforms needed to achieve this? 
5. Under what circumstances does increased on-grid renewable energy capacity 
translate into increased access to and increased reliability of electricity supply in 
developing countries? 
 
This report summarises the existing general literature on these questions. Country studies 
will apply the same questions to Kenya and Ghana. This is important. As we shall see, 
many of the answers are context specific. For example, whether or not a potential 
technology is ‘economically viable’ depends on factors such as resource abundance, 
existing infrastructure and financing costs. These vary significantly across regions and 
countries, and even within the same country.  
 
As well as reviewing the various literatures, this report defines the following key concepts: 
‘inclusive green growth’; ‘economic viability’ and ‘financial viability’. These definitions 
provide the basis for selecting electricity generation technologies. As described in the first 
research question, we are interested in understanding why technologies which have these 
three characteristics – and would therefore be considered broadly desirable – are not 
deployed at scale. Given the central role accorded to these concepts, considerable 
attention is paid to defining them precisely.  
 
The review thus begins by discussing and defining inclusive green growth. We then define 
what is meant by green renewable energy technologies that are economically and 
financially viable. This definition provides the background for the review of cost estimates 
for different technologies, as well as the methodologies used to produce these estimates. 
The third and fourth chapters review the literature on constraints to investment in 
renewable energies and policies to address these respectively. Chapter 5 considers what 
we know about the political economy of sustainable energy, while Chapter 6 examines 
how Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been used in this area. The 
final review chapter looks at the engineering literature on the links between increased 
supply, reliability and equitable access to electricity. We conclude by identifying the gaps 
in the current literature and showing how our approach will address these. 
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1 What is green and inclusive growth? 
In 2012, the World Bank defined ‘inclusive green growth’, as: 
 
...growth that is efficient in its use of natural resources, clean in that it minimises 
pollution and environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural 
hazards and the role of environmental management and natural capital in 
preventing physical disasters. And this growth needs to be inclusive.  
(Fay 2012) 
 
More expansive definitions of the ‘inclusive’ aspects of growth than this have also been 
given. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (2011) defines inclusive 
green growth as that which: 
 
...embraces social, economic and environmental pillars and is promoted based on 
principles of inclusiveness, equity, particularly gender equity and women’s 
empowerment, and sustainability. It supports the alleviation of poverty through 
green job creation, sustainable energy for all, low-carbon technologies; and 
promotion of sustainable urban living. It recognizes the importance of and interplay 
between natural capital and social capital, equally important assets that must be 
managed and invested in. 
(United Nations Development Programme 2011) 
 
While the Bank accepts that ‘green growth’ will not automatically be ‘inclusive’, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argues for a more proactive approach to 
ensure that it is: redistributive measures, active policies of green job creation and the 
targeting of sectors where growth would disproportionately benefit the poor are all 
proposed. ‘Inclusive green growth’ can thus be understood in a variety of ways. In the first 
part of this chapter, the term is unpacked and defined. Having established a conceptual 
foundation, the second part of the chapter applies this to the issue of access to electricity.  
 
1.1 Unpacking the concept of inclusive green growth 
The term ‘inclusive green growth’ is a recent hybrid, combining the concept of ‘inclusive 
growth’ with that of ‘green growth’. Before examining the hybrid form, therefore, we 
consider the components from which it is constructed. 
 
‘Inclusive growth’ can be defined in different ways, reflecting disagreements over the 
related concept, ‘pro-poor’ growth. In its ‘weak’ form, growth is ‘pro-poor’ when it results in 
absolute increases in the income of the poor. For the ‘strong’ form, pro-poor growth 
requires the relative incomes of the poor to rise, so that growth also reduces inequality.  
 
For the World Bank, inclusive growth means equality of opportunity with respect to: 
‘access to markets, resources and unbiased regulatory environment for businesses and 
individuals’ (Ianchovichina and Lundstrom 2009). The authors are explicit that their 
‘definition is in line with the absolute definition of pro-poor growth, but not the relative 
definition’ (ibid.). As described in Klasen (2010), others take a different view. Rauniyar 
and Kanbur (2010), for example, define inclusive growth as ‘growth with declining 
inequality’. 
 
Ali and Son (2007) define inclusive growth as ‘pro-poor improvements in social 
opportunities.’ This definition has two distinctive features: it moves the focus from income 
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to the non-income aspects of welfare; and, as with the World Bank’s definition, the 
emphasis is on equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome. 
 
Two dimensions of difference in definitions of inclusive growth can thus be identified. 
First, inclusive growth may refer to process (i.e. citizens participate in the policy process). 
Or it may refer to outcome (i.e. how the benefits of growth are distributed across groups in 
the population, how much additional electricity supply is actually consumed by different 
groups, or the levels of education achieved by different income groups). Second, growth 
may be either ‘weakly’ or ‘strongly’ inclusive. Growth would be considered weakly 
inclusive if the poor – or other disadvantaged groups – are able to participate in, or benefit 
from, it to some degree. To be strongly inclusive, however, these groups would have to 
participate more, or receive more of the benefits of growth, or of the additional supply of 
electricity, than did wealthier groups.  
 
The concept of ‘green growth’ is also contested. Some view the term as an oxymoron, 
believing that economic growth is incompatible with sustainability, regardless of its colour 
(Jackson 2011). Others take the polar opposite view, arguing that ‘green ‘growth’ is the 
only sort of growth that is possible over the longer term (Stern 2006).  
 
These disagreements largely result from different views on what environmental 
sustainability means, particularly the extent to which ‘natural capital’ is substitutable for 
‘man-made capital’. Those arguing from a ‘weak sustainability’ position are more likely to 
think such substitution is possible than would those taking a ‘strong sustainability’ 
position.1 The implications for growth are significant. Growth involves the consumption of 
natural resources. From a weak sustainability perspective, this is fine as long as the 
natural capital used in the growth process is replaced with other forms of (man-made) 
capital. The total stock of capital would therefore remain unchanged. From a strong 
sustainability perspective, this is less straightforward. If it is not possible to replace natural 
capital with other forms (e.g. man-made capital), then natural capital used in the growth 
process is lost permanently, and the total stock of capital is reduced. If maintaining the 
total stock of capital is an objective, therefore, growth is a problem and ‘green growth’ a 
contradiction in terms.  
 
In practice these distinctions are more blurred: there is a spectrum of opinion rather than 
a binary dichotomy. Everyone accept that some forms of natural capital are substitutable 
while others are not. Much of the debate thus centres around which forms of natural 
capital are most important, and whether these are substitutable or not. For example, 
(Gray 1990) identifies four forms of capital: Critical (e.g. stable climate, rainforests, 
oceans, water supply); non-renewable/non-substitutable (e.g. oil and mineral products); 
non-renewable/substitutable (e.g. energy usage); and, renewable (e.g. timber, fisheries).  
Using this categorisation, Neumayer (2003) argues that non-substitutability of capital is 
not always the main issue. Fossil fuels are not substitutable, for example, but this does 
not mean they should be preserved forever. What is important is energy transformation 
from one form to another, and this can be done using renewables. The problem of 
exploiting fossil-fuels therefore is the impact this has on climate change, not that they 
cannot be replaced, which is a different issue.2 For Neumayer, what matters is that 
                                                     
1
 For an excellent review of the concepts of weak and strong sustainability see Neumayer, E. (2003). Weak versus strong 
sustainability: exploring the limits of two opposing paradigms, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
2
 The economics – and intergenerational ethics – of exploiting non-renewable natural resources turn on the use to which the 
resultant revenues are put. Specifically, the issue is whether revenues are invested such that the total stock of capital in the 
economy – i.e. that which is bequeathed to future generations – is increased. For the classical paper see: Hartwick (1977). 
For a more recent treatment, see: Collier (2010).  
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‘critical capital’ is preserved, as this is both essential for human civilisation and cannot be 
replaced. 
  
While most agree that there are certain forms of critical capital that should be preserved 
(or planetary boundaries respected (Rockström, Steffen et al. 2009), there are major 
differences on how much critical capital should be preserved, or where planetary 
boundaries lie. The ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ sustainability debate can be seen through this 
lens. Another point of contention is the extent to which growth can be ‘dematerialised’ or 
decoupled from resource use (Jackson 2011). Does more growth inevitably lead to more 
resource use or is it possible to grow while using fewer resources? From a climate 
change perspective, does rising GDP always increase carbon emissions or is it possible 
to grow while emissions fall to sustainable levels? On both questions, those in the weak 
sustainability camp tend to take a more optimistic view, while their strong sustainability 
counterparts are more pessimistic, often invoking the ‘precautionary principle’ (Foster, 
Vecchia and Repacholi 2000).  
 
For both the ‘inclusive’ and ‘green’ components of ‘inclusive green growth’, we therefore 
have a range of opinions, from weak to strong forms. This is illustrated with the four 
quadrants in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1  Dimensions of inclusive green growth 
 
 Inclusiveness 
Weak Strong 
G
re
e
n
n
e
ss
 Weak 1 2 
Strong 3 4 
Source: Authors’ own 
Quadrant 1 describes those arguments that see any form of growth that benefits the poor 
as ‘inclusive’, while also taking a relatively optimistic view on the substitutability of natural 
capital. The World Bank would broadly fit into this camp – when the staff at the Bank 
mention ‘inclusive green growth’, therefore, this is what they mean (Ianchovichina and 
Lundstrom 2009; Fay 2012). 
  
Quadrant 3 combines a lack of focus on inclusiveness, with a much stronger concern for 
preserving natural capital. Those that argue for the intrinsic worth of the natural 
environment and against an anthropocentric view that privileges human interests over 
those of other forms of life might be found here. Both the feasibility and desirability of 
‘green growth’ would tend to be questioned here. Quadrant 4 shares this scepticism about 
the possibility of ‘dematerialising’ growth, but combines this with a ‘strongly inclusive’ 
approach to poverty and inequality. As growth is seen as incompatible with environmental 
sustainability, those who take this perspective argue for a more equitable distribution of 
(finite) resources, and also often stress the potential positive well-being effects of a 
reduced focus on economic growth. Tim Jackson’s book ‘Prosperity without Growth’ 
(2009) is perhaps the best-known exposition of this perspective. 
 
Quadrant 2 is where many of those working in the international development community 
would be found. A strong emphasis on poverty and inequality is the traditional focus of 
this community. This has been combined in recent decades, however, with an increasing 
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emphasis on environmental sustainability, which has more commonly been of ‘weak’ than 
‘strong’ form. An anthropocentric view is usually taken, with the ‘value’ of the environment 
being its use-value to human beings rather than anything intrinsic. 
  
In relation to our research into green growth diagnostics, we would align ourselves with 
this perspective. There are two aspects to this. First, there is the question of how pro-poor 
(or inclusive) the growth effects of increasing the supply of renewable energy will be; 
second, is the question of how pro-poor (or inclusive) the access to increased energy 
supply will be. In both cases, we take a broadly ‘strong’ inclusive approach, though we are 
largely concerned with the latter. Specifically we are interested in identifying and removing 
barriers to renewable technologies where access by the poor is at least as great as that 
for other groups. 
  
1.2 Inclusive green electricity 
 
Electricity generation, transmission, distribution and use are key elements of inclusive 
green growth. Lack of infrastructure is a major constraint to economic growth in most 
African countries and lack of access to reliable electricity is in particular rated by most 
African enterprises as one of their most important constraints to growth (Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen 2010). 
  
Inclusiveness cannot be presumed. If renewable energy sources are more costly than 
fossil fuel alternatives, for example, they may require scarce public finance to be diverted 
from other development priorities or adversely affect final consumers if tariffs go up as a 
result. Set against this, many developing countries currently provide fossil fuel subsidies 
that do not particularly benefit the poor (World Bank 2012). It is important to take full 
account of the different economic and financial costs and benefits associated with 
renewable technologies, particularly as these are allocated between groups in society. 
The process we will use to select technologies to examine is designed to address this. 
  
The final impact on the poor of increased investment in renewable electricity capacity 
depends on a number of factors (Pueyo; Gonzalez; Dent and DeMartino 2013). First, 
increased capacity should increase access, as new people obtain connections and more 
electricity consumption is possible for those already connected. While this is relatively 
straightforward in off-grid systems, it is more complex for on-grid systems where the 
source of electricity is not known. The additional consumption enabled by new capacity 
depends on a number of technical factors such as: the type of low carbon generation (e.g. 
intermittent vs. dispatchable); the location of the plant in relation to demand; the layout, 
capacity and reliability of the network; the distribution of demand at different times; the 
availability of renewable resources at different times; and changes in the number of 
consumers, including illegal connections which are common in developing countries. The 
distributional impact of increased renewable energy capacity can be assessed by 
quantifying who is able to consume clean energy from on-grid projects through power 
system reliability evaluations. Second, poor populations need to be explicitly targeted in 
grid extension or intensification and off-grid access programmes. Without a requirement 
to reach poor populations, more densely populated and wealthier communities located 
closer to the grid tend to be prioritised for financial /economic reasons. 
  
Once grid or off-grid electricity reaches a community, households and businesses are 
given the opportunity to connect (at a price). Despite this, connection rates and use may 
remain low because of low incomes relative to high upfront costs of electricity and related 
appliances. The cost, availability, performance and who chooses the end-use conversion 
technology are essential, as it is this technology that determines the nature and scale of 
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impact of electricity use. Bad quality of service may also lead to low electricity use, and 
this is often related to the financial difficulties of electricity suppliers. To ensure that the 
poor can benefit, therefore, a balance needs to be struck between affordability and the 
financial sustainability of the provider. This may require subsidies, either for connection or 
for use tariffs. The evidence suggests that the former may be more important for the poor. 
 
To ensure that investment in renewable energy capacity benefits the poor at least as 
much as other groups – i.e. that it is inclusive – it is crucial that these issues are fully 
considered. 
 
 
2 Target power generation technologies 
 
Having established what we mean by inclusive green growth and electricity, the next step 
is to identify a target group of green energy technologies that could contribute to these 
goals, while also having the potential to compete with fossil fuel alternatives. 
  
2.1 Green power generation technologies 
 
What qualifies as ‘green energy’? Three potential categories can be identified: (i) a switch 
to less polluting forms of fossil fuel generation (e.g. coal to gas); (ii) efficiency measures 
to reduce energy use per unit of output; and (iii) new renewable energy production 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). 
 
 The main alternatives in the first category include: 
  
 Switching from coal-fired power plants to modern natural gas preferably in 
combined cycle power plants (NGCC) 
 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Plants  
 CO2 capture and storage 
 Capture and use of fugitive gas emissions (including flaring) 
 
Energy efficiency measures entail both improvements in the transmission and distribution 
systems which increase the amount of power generated that reaches the final consumer 
and the mechanisms by which the power is converted into energy services. Transmission 
and distribution losses as a percentage of output (including technical and non-technical 
losses) vary considerably between countries, with some developing countries having 
losses of over 20 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) had average 
transmission and distribution losses of 10 per cent in 2011. Kenya and Ghana 
experienced 17 per cent and 18 per cent of losses in the same year (World Bank Data 
2014). 
 
The third potential form of ‘green power’ is new renewable energy capacity, including bio-
energy, solar energy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean and wind energy. Among 
renewable energy generation we can also distinguish between large scale centralised and 
smaller scale distributed options. We define small scale distributed generation as that 
independently operated, located near their customers and selling to retail customers on a 
mini-grid, to the national utility on the main grid or both (Tenenbaum, Greacen, 
Siyambalapitiya and Knuckles 2014). The differentiation between small and large scale is 
important because the size of the plant can have a significant impact on the cost per kW. 
There is not an absolute consensus on the size that qualifies as ‘small’, but regulations in 
several African and Asian countries point at 10 MW as the capacity threshold. 
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Some renewable generation technologies have achieved a level of technical and 
economic maturity that enables deployment at a significant scale. This is the case of 
hydropower, many bio-energy and geothermal technologies. Onshore wind technologies 
are also mature, offshore wind less so, though the gap is narrowing. Solar energy 
includes a wide range of maturities from R&D stage to technically mature. Most ocean 
energy technologies remain at the demonstration stage. 
 
While substantial reductions in emissions can – and should – be achieved with the first of 
these two categories, this will not be sufficient. The global goal to stabilise temperatures 
below 2ºC requires emissions intensities to be approaching zero in the second half of the 
21st century, making even the most efficient fossil-fuel unviable. While Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) could potentially be effective, the largest mitigation potential lies in 
renewable (and nuclear) energy generation. 
 
The role of developing countries to achieve stabilisation is unquestionable. The 
developing country origin share in cumulated GHG emissions (including those from 
agriculture and land use change) since 1850, which determine current atmospheric GHG 
concentration levels and hence climate change, is already roughly equal to the developed 
country share, and has been estimated by den Elzen, Olivier, Höhne and Janssens-
Maenhout (2013) to reach 56 percent by 2020. Even though this has been mostly driven 
by upper middle income countries (mainly China), lower income countries are expected to 
significantly rise their share of global emissions, mainly as a result of population growth 
and increasing levels of welfare. An early adoption of low-carbon paths in low income 
countries with an underdeveloped generation infrastructure will avoid a high carbon 
technology lock-in right from the start, reducing the economic burden of GHG mitigation in 
the future (Willenbockel 2014). If this low carbon generation infrastructure is also lower 
cost and can potentially compete with fossil fuel alternatives, alone or with external 
funding, the goal of poverty reduction would not be compromised. 
 
On the basis of its compatibility with the global goal to stabilise temperatures below 2ºC, 
its contribution to energy security, and to the avoidance of carbon lock-in for African 
countries that still have an underdeveloped generation infrastructure, we will focus our 
analysis of green growth mainly on renewable energy generation. 
  
2.2 Economic and financial viability of green power generation 
technologies 
 
We seek to target renewable energy technologies that are economically and financially 
viable. Economic viability takes into account costs and benefits for society, whereas 
financial viability looks at the actual private costs to firms or individuals. Externalities 
emerge when there are differences between private and social costs. They can be 
positive or negative. In the case of electricity generation, local pollution or global climate 
change are well known external costs of fossil fuel based plants. Intermittent renewable 
generation technologies can also present negative externalities if, for example, they 
impose balancing costs for the electricity system which are not covered by the generator. 
On the other hand, increasing the share of renewable energy in generation portfolios can 
act as a hedge against the volatility of fossil fuel prices and the potential increase in the 
carbon price (Awerbuch and Spencer 2007). 
 
Increasing modern energy services supply in a country where demand outstrips supply is 
very likely to be economically viable, measured in terms of the economic-rate-of-return 
(ERR), as economic benefits to society outweigh costs. However, this positive economic 
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return can be achieved using different technologies. By this definition, the lower the cost 
of energy supply, the higher the economic returns to society. Accordingly, energy 
planning in developing countries, as in developed ones, has been traditionally focused on 
finding the ‘least-cost’ generating alternative. 
 
Financial viability is a related, but distinct concept. Financially viable investments yield a 
risk-adjusted financial rate of return (FRR) that is competitive with other investment 
options and sufficient to attract private investment. ‘Risk-adjusted’ is an important aspect 
of this definition. Private investors demand very different levels of return for ostensibly 
similar projects, depending on the risk – real or perceived – associated with the project. 
The returns required for a renewable energy project in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 
will be higher than the same project in the UK. Similarly, within the same country, 
perceptions of risk can vary significantly between technologies, with those considered 
well-proven requiring lower return expectations. For internationally and sectorially mobile 
investors, therefore, the opportunity cost of a given investment is not necessarily the 
same investment in another country, but an investment that would yield the same risk-
adjusted return, which is unlikely to be the same thing. 
 
The core difference between ERR and FRR is that the latter only captures the private 
returns to the investor, on the basis of their actual expenses and revenues, while the ERR 
also captures the broader economic costs and benefits to society (hence including 
externalities). While investments with an ERR that meets society’s test discount rate3 
would be considered viable, this is not the case for financial returns. Here an investment 
must have a risk adjusted FRR that is as high as potential alternatives. 
 
In many cases, the private costs of renewables could already be competitive with fossil 
fuels if we considered a uniform cost of finance. However, the cost of finance may be 
higher in renewable energy investments due to perceptions of risk, rendering them 
commercially inviable. This is particularly problematic in developing countries, where risks 
may already be thought high. Addressing these issues of real and perceived risk such that 
underlying competitiveness can translate into commercial competiveness (i.e. financial 
viability) is thus very important. When the cost of finance cannot be reduced to an 
appropriate level for otherwise competitive investments, an alternative solution is boosting 
the revenues accruing to renewables (through price premiums delivered via feed-in-tariffs, 
for example), or by subsidising costs (e.g. fixed capital investment costs). Here the 
questions are how large this subsidy needs to be, and whether the source of funds is 
external to the country or not. Where the subsidy is small and likely to diminish further 
over time, the benefits of renewable energy may justify this. Where the cost is large, 
however, it may be unreasonable to expect the government of a developing country to 
bear this cost, which amounts to a drag on its development prospects more generally – 
when looked at from an economy-wide perspective, very high costs could even 
undermine the economic viability of the investment in question. If additional financial costs 
are met externally, perhaps through donor support, this constraint no longer applies. 
 
To summarise, we are interested in why certain renewable energy technologies are not 
deployed or are not deployed at scale in developing countries. We are not interested in 
just any technologies, however, but in those that meet the following criteria: 
 
                                                     
3
 Generic single discount factor be used by government departments to appraise policies, programmes and projects and 
that is intended to value the social time preference 
16 
 
i. That they are the lowest economic cost renewable technologies in the country 
concerned 
 
ii. That they bring positive externalities and minimise negative ones 
 
iii. That they have the potential to be financially competitive with fossil fuel 
alternatives (excluding taxes and subsidies). 
 
iv. That this financial competitiveness is not achieved at an unacceptable cost to 
government (i.e. that financial viability is not achieved at an excessive expense for 
economic viability). 
 
2.3 Review of cost estimates of renewable electricity technologies 
 
A useful tool to identify least cost renewable options and compare their competitiveness 
with fossil fuel based alternatives is the ‘levelised cost of energy’ (LCOE). LCOE 
measures the total cost of producing electricity over the lifetime of an electricity 
generation project, and is comprised of capital investment, operating and maintenance 
(O&M), and financing costs. These costs are discounted from a shared reference date. 
 
The selected discount rate has a considerable influence on the calculated LCOE. 
Different types of technologies and in different locations have a different risk profile and 
hence assume different interest rates. Renewable energy technologies are more sensitive 
to high discount rates because they have relatively high capital costs per unit of output 
and relatively low recurrent costs, while non-renewable options have relatively low capital 
costs and higher recurrent costs. This feature often limits the use of renewable energy by 
poor countries, because the opportunity cost of capital increases with lower incomes and 
so the present is valued more highly than the future. Similarly, where generating utilities 
have very severe limits on capital expenditures, their opportunity cost of capital at the 
margin rises to very high levels. They will then commonly opt for technologies with a lower 
initial capital cost, such as diesel generators, over an apparently preferable renewable 
option, such as microhydro (Barnett, Lucas and Standing 2002). Using identical discount 
rates for all technologies and locations, as many studies do, is bound to result in 
deviations from the actual LCOE. More accurate estimates can be obtained by using 
discount rates that represent the usual capital costs in the market for the respective 
investment, and that take into account the usual share and interest rates of debt and 
equity, calculated as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
 
The cash values of expenditures over the project lifecycle discounted at an appropriate 
rate are divided by the amount of electricity generated over the same period to give an 
average cost per kWh, usually in US$ cents. The annual amount of electricity generation 
in kWh is also discounted to account for the fact that the farther electricity generation is in 
the future, the lower its cash value today (Kost, Mayer, Thomsen, Hartmann, Senkpiel, 
Philips, Nold, Lude, Saad and Schlegl 2013). 
 
LCOE are usually estimated taking into account only the private cost for the investor, 
including taxes and subsidies in costs, excluding externalities and using financial discount 
rates. They are therefore useful to evaluate the financial viability of the project. However, 
LCOE could also include the cost to society (for example, by adding the cost of GHG 
emissions using a particular carbon price or the costs of disposing of by-products, 
whether or not the utility pays for these) hence reflecting economic viability. In an 
economic analysis the costs are before taxes and subsidies, the discount rate is be the 
country‘s social discount rate and the asset lives are the time period over which the asset 
17 
 
continues to give service (Chubu Electric Power Company & Economic Consulting 
Associates Ltd. 2012). 
 
One important shortcoming of the LCOE is that it does not represent the cost of individual 
projects for the electricity system as a whole, which would need to consider grid 
connection, costs of integrating intermittent sources or the requirement of back-up 
capacity based on conventional thermal plants (World Energy Council 2013). 
 
The following formula applies for calculating the LCOE for new plants: 
 
Where: 
 I0 : Investment expenditures in common currency 
 
 At : Annual total costs in year t in common currency (private or social) 
 
 Mt,el : Produced quantity of electricity in the respective year in kWh 
 
 i :Real interest rate in %. The share of external financing and equity financing can 
be included in the analysis explicitly through the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC).  
 
 n : Operational lifetime in years 
 
 t : Year of lifetime (1, 2, ...n) 
 
The apparent simplicity of the formula hides the multiple assumptions that need to be 
made when providing LCOE, which are the reason for the differences in values provided 
from different sources. These include the following (mainly based in the META model by 
Chubu Electric Power company and Economic Consulting Associates 2012): 
 
 Capacity factor for the estimation of the quantity of electricity produced. It is 
defined as the actual output compared to the maximum possible output at which 
the plant can operate. The higher the capacity factor, the lower the LCOE will be. 
However, some plants are specifically chosen for peaking duty and have 
deliberate low capacity factors. For this reason, the LCOE of peak power plants 
are not directly comparable with those of base load plants. 
 
 Effect of unit sizes. Different plant sizes lead to different costs as a result of 
economies of scale. 
 
 Debt to equity ratios and the cost of finance. They are often assumed to be 
uniform, but in fact vary enormously per type of technology, location and size. 
 
 Capital costs. They can vary a lot per location and include or not different 
elements, such as batteries or environmental control technologies. 
 
 Fuel characteristics, including heating value, sulphur, carbon and ash content. 
For example, the quality of coal supplied to a plant influences the capital and 
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operating costs of coal thermal plants, as well as the emission values used if 
externalities are included in the costs. 
  
 Fuel prices. Fossil fuel prices are highly volatile. Predicted values are based on a 
number of assumptions and likely to differ between sources. 
  
 Operation and maintenance costs. They are influenced by local technology 
maturity, economies of scale and wages. 
 
 Transmission and distribution costs. They are highly project specific, 
dependent on the distance between the energy resource and demand and the 
availability of existing transmission lines. Even though these could significantly 
increase project costs, particularly in developing countries, they are not 
considered by most sources. 
 
 Transmission and distribution losses. Accurate estimates of the cost of 
electricity should take into account the cost of losses along a transmission and 
distribution network. 
 
 Externalities. Measurements of externalities are controversial, as they involve 
putting money values on environmental burdens and damages to people, primarily 
health and reduced life expectancy (Markandya 2012). Those estimates that 
include them may only take into account climate change by using carbon prices, or 
go further to also include the cost of local pollution on health, building materials, 
crops and biodiversity (ibid). 
 
We consider four sources for the purposes of this review of LCOE: the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (2012); IRENA (2013), the World Energy Council (2013) and 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2010)4. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2012: 846-7) concludes that ‘a 
comparison of LCOE of RE technologies with those of other technologies (nuclear, gas 
and coal power plants) shows that- as long as externalities are not taken into account – 
RE sources are often not yet competitive with other sources, especially if they both feed 
into the electricity grid’. However, ‘given suitable conditions, the lower end of the LCOE 
ranges indicate that some RE technologies already can compete with traditional forms at 
current energy market prices in many regions of the world’. 
 
The LCOE value ranges calculated by the IPCC are shown in Figure 2.1. The IPCC 
calculations use three different discount rates – 3, 7 and 10 per cent - and do not include 
the cost of transmission and distribution. Data are from 2008 and 2009, and exclude 
outliers. The range is often huge, at many hundreds of percentage difference between the 
lowest cost and the highest cost even on the same technology. 
 
Figure 2.1 does not include the range of LCOE for non-renewable sources, but it is shown 
somewhere else in the IPCC report as between 0-10 UScents2005/kWh, with aggregated 
technology subcategories and discount rates. As we can see, under particular 
circumstances some forms of renewable energy can be competitive with fossil fuel 
alternatives. This include bioenergy (co-firing, small scale CHP, Steam turbine, 
                                                     
4
 We could not access the raw data of all these sources and hence are unable to analyse the differences in the parameters 
listed above and their influence in the final values of LCOE estimated. 
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gasification ICE), geothermal, hydropower and onshore wind. Competiveness is easier at 
lower discount rates, the effects of which are more pronounced in some cases than 
others. Solar PV can only compete with fossil fuel alternatives with a low discount rate, for 
example, and in regions of high solar irradiation (this is the lower bound of the cost 
range). With low discount rates and high capacity factors, offshore wind technology could 
also compete with fossil fuel alternatives. Ocean energy is still far from being competitive 
at the present time.  
 
Figure 2.1 Levelized cost of electricity for commercially available RE technologies 
at 3,7 and 10 per cent discount rates (UScents2005/kWh) 
 
 
Source: Reproduced with Permission of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012) 
5
 
 
 
There are thought to be significant opportunities to decrease the LCOE of renewable 
energy through learning processes, upsizing of technologies and economies of scale (and 
increasing load factors). While we have strong evidence of learning rates for onshore 
wind, solar PV and biomass technologies, using historic experience to extrapolate future 
                                                     
5
 IPCC 2012: IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Prepared by Working 
Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Figures... Cambridge University Press 
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learning effects is very uncertain. Important technological advances and cost reductions 
are also expected in advanced PV and CSP technologies, enhanced geothermal systems, 
ocean energy and offshore wind. However technical changes in battery technology 
appears stubbornly difficult and costs remain relatively high. 
Even though the aggregate LCOE ranges presented by IRENA (2013) do not differ highly 
from those in the IPCC report, IRENA shows a more optimistic view, in contrast with the 
more moderate views of the IPCC, concluding that  
 
renewable technologies are now the most economic solution for new capacity in 
an increasing number of countries and regions. Where oil-fired generation is the 
predominant power generation source (e.g. on islands, off-grid and in some 
countries) a lower-cost renewable solution almost always exists today. 
Renewables are also the most economic solution for new grid-connected capacity 
where good resources are available. 
(IRENA 2013) 
 
The analysis is based on around 8,000 projects around the world, with data collected from 
a variety of sources such as business journals, industry associations, consultancies, 
governments, auctions and tenders. Data is for 2011 and 2012, and although their 
database has project information on the debt/equity ratio and cost of finance from these 
two sources, all LCOE calculations assume a 10 per cent cost of capital to allow for direct 
comparisons. Transmission and distribution costs are excluded, although the report 
acknowledges that T&D costs of 5 to 15 USD cents/kWh would need to be added to the 
total costs of utility-scale solutions. The range of fossil fuel LCOE used for comparison is 
6-12 USDc2012/kWh, based in OECD values. However, this range does not take into 
account the very low cost of fossil fuel based generation in developing countries such as 
China or South Africa with abundant coal reserves and very low installed costs. 
 
Like the IPCC, IRENA’s analysis stresses the context specificity of costs, which depend 
on local resource availability and cost structures. Mature technologies such as biomass, 
geothermal and hydropower are able to produce electricity at competitive costs with fossil 
fuel based technologies when excellent local resources are available, although in limited 
quantities. The next most economic technology is onshore wind, followed by solar PV and 
CSP. 
  
Figure 2.2 shows LCOE cost ranges per technology and region, with the horizontal bar 
representing the weighted average LCOE. The figure shows significant differences by 
region, with China and India having some of the most competitive renewable costs for 
hydro, biomass and onshore wind. These countries, also have some of the cheapest 
fossil fuel based plants, which makes it hard for renewables to be competitive without 
policy support. Biomass and hydro are also cheap options, and geothermal particularly 
so, in the rest of Asia. Latin America is most competitive in bioenergy and hydro 
resources, with very good wind resources in many locations, which compensates for 
higher installed costs for wind. Additionally, excellent solar resources in Peru and Chile, 
and economies of scale for large PV projects can provide competitive solar PV power 
plants in this region. Data for African projects are thin, but suggest competitive wind, 
biomass, hydro and geothermal resources. IRENA forecasts significant equipment cost 
reductions expected by 2020, particularly for CSP, solar PV and wind. 
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Figure 2.2  Typical LCOE cost ranges for renewable power generation 
technologies by region, 2012 (USD/kWh) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from IRENA (2013)  
 
The World Energy Council (WEC 2013) uses actual project data from Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (BNEF), proprietary data on renewables and conventional generation 
technologies to calculate LCOEs. A ‘sophisticated discounted cash flow model’ allows 
them ‘to capture the cost impact of the timing of cash flows, development and 
construction costs, multiple stages of financing and interest and tax implications of long-
term debt instruments and depreciation, among other factors’ (World Energy Council 
2013: 6). Details of the model are not provided. Depreciation is not included in the cash 
flow stream of most other models, as cash flow is generally understood to only represent 
actual cash revenues and expenses, which means their costs could be higher than those 
provided by other sources. The cost of debt applied is not disclosed but the report 
explains that it uses ‘appropriate debt/equity ratios, spreads and tenors for the operational 
term loans and where applicable construction and development loans’ for technologies 
that are bankable. The study assumes that all equity investors require a 10 per cent return 
in constant prices. Capital costs exclude transmission and distribution costs, even though 
they recognise that for certain technologies such as offshore wind, they can represent a 
large share of total costs. Taxes are included, with tax rates sourced from the corporate 
income tax surveys of KPMG and Deloitte. Externalities are not included. 
 
Figure shows the most recent WEC estimates for the US and Canada, Western Europe, 
China, India and Japan. These indicate a wide cost spectrum across the renewable 
energy technologies, considerably wider than that for conventional power generation. In 
these estimates mature technologies, such as hydro, geothermal, onshore wind or landfill 
gas when in good locations, can easily compete with conventional sources. 
  
The WEC estimates of the LCOE of conventional power generation sources show a wide 
range for coal, with Chinese coal as low as 3.5-3.9 USD cents/kWh and as high as 12-17 
USD cents/kWh for a comparable new build plant in the United Kingdom. Combined Cycle 
Gas Turbines (CCGT) are cleaner, cheaper and easier to build than coal plants but face 
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higher costs of fuel. The estimated global LCOE of new CCGT plants is 6.9 USD 
cents/kWh, but costs are highly variable regionally, depending on local gas resources. 
New plants are particularly attractive in the US, for example, where natural gas prices 
have fallen due to shale gas extraction. 
 
A comparison of WEC estimates with those of the IPCC and IRENA points at significantly 
lower costs for solar PV, a wider range for LCOE, with much higher bound values for 
some renewables, as they don’t seem to have eliminated outliers, and a higher cost of 
fossil fuel based generation. Some of the reasons behind these differences could be: that 
they use more recent data which takes into account the decline in solar PV technology 
costs over the past few years; and that they primarily take into account projects from 
developed countries, where the cost of finance is lower and hence renewables can be 
more competitive. 
 
Figure 2.3  Global levelised cost of energy in Q2 2013 (USD/MWh) 
 
Source: Reproduced with Permission of the World Energy Council (2013)
6
  
 
                                                     
6
 World Energy Council (2013), London, www.worldenergy.org 
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Further estimates of LCOE for conventional generation and renewables are provided by 
the International Energy Agency (2010). Using 2009 data of projects to be commissioned 
by 2015, costs are provided for nuclear and fossil fuel thermal power stations as well as 
electricity from renewable sources. The study considers 21 countries, including non-
OECD members Brazil, Russia, South Africa and China. Estimations are based on real 
data from 190 power plants. Two real discount rates were used: 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent, as well as a social carbon price of USD 30 per tonne of CO2. As with the previous 
sources, transmission and distribution and other systemic costs, such as the costs of 
back-up for intermittent sources, are not included. The study agrees with the findings of 
the previous literature reviewed: ‘there is no technology that has a clear overall advantage 
globally or even regionally’. Nuclear, coal, gas, hydro and wind are considered as fairly 
competitive technologies for baseload power generation, but their costs are highly context 
specific. 
 
Using the 10 per cent discount rate and OECD countries data, the LCOE of coal-fired 
power plants ranges between 0.067 USD cents/kWh in Australia and 14.2 USD 
cents/kWh in the Slovak Republic. For gas-fired plants they range between 7.6 USD 
cents/kWh in Australia and 12 USD cents/kWh in Italy. The LCOE of fossil fuel based 
plants would be reduced considerably if carbon prices were not taken into account, as 
many other LCOE estimates do. Onshore wind generation shows costs between 7 USD 
cents/kWh in the US and 23.4 USD cents/kWh in Switzerland. The LCOE of solar PV 
reaches 33.3 USD cents/kWh for high load factors and 60 USD cents/kWh for low load 
factors, with CSP reaching 24.3 USD cents/kWh. 
 
The International Energy Agency (2010) study includes extensive sensitivity analyses for 
key cost parameters which demonstrate that the relative competitiveness of different 
power generation technologies is highly sensitive to the discount rate applied and to 
projected prices for CO2, natural gas and coal. 
 
As regards the economics of on-grid versus off-grid electricity supply, the cost of each 
option depends on the size and distribution of energy resources and populations, the per 
capita electricity consumption, the local cost of infrastructure and the characteristics of the 
terrain (Parshall, Pillai, Mohan, Sanoh and Modi 2009; Deichmann, Meisner, Murray and 
Wheeler 2011; Levin and Thomas 2012). Studies modelling the least cost mix of 
centralised and decentralised electricity show that for the majority of the world’s 
population and area, centralised power supply is the most cost effective approach. 
Decentralised options are the least-cost option of a significant minority of population, 
particularly in rural and remote parts of Africa. An analysis of 150 countries shows that for 
11 countries, all of them African except for Afghanistan, decentralised generation would 
be the least cost alternative for more than 50 per cent of the population (Levin and 
Thomas 2012), which does not mean that the electricity provided would be affordable. 
Calculations for Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana show that the largest percentage of the 
population can be cost-effectively served with centralised options. However, in remote 
locations with very good hydro, wind or solar resources, minigrid systems are lower cost 
than grid connected options. Provision of off-grid energy for health centres, schools or 
administrative centres is part of Government policy or recognised by Governments as a 
viable solution in a number of countries such as in Rwanda7 and Kenya8. On a smaller 
scale, Kenya has a large market for small PV systems (12-50Wp) for off-grid power. 
These are expected to have an install rate of 10 MW by 2020. 
                                                     
7
 Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. (n.d.). 
8
 Republic of Kenya Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. (2013).  
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Decentralised options may still be preferred even if they are not the most cost-effective 
option, for example when grid supply is unreliable or when central utilities are slow and 
ineffective to expand grid connections (Deichmann et al. 2011; Levin and Thomas 2012). 
 
To summarise, estimating renewable energy costs is complex, highly dependent on local 
conditions, the many assumptions that have to be made, what is included and not (i.e. 
transmission costs) and on financing costs. These factors play a large part in determining 
whether particular technologies are competitive with fossil-fuel alternatives in any given 
location, as does the cost and availability of fossil-fuel generation. Generally more mature 
technologies will be more competitive, but this may be more than offset by local factors. 
Besides, global LCOE estimates that assume a maximum 10 per cent cost of finance 
need to be looked at with caution in Africa, where a reasonable weighted average cost of 
capital is 15-20 per cent except where strong guarantees are in place (IRENA, 2013). 
Considering the actual cost of finance in Africa would damage the competitiveness of 
renewables in LCOE estimations as compared to fossil fuels. Approaching this question 
on a location-specific way is therefore essential. 
 
 
3 Constraints to investment in renewable 
energy generation 
 
A number of reviews of constraints to renewable energy investment have been 
undertaken over the past 10 years. As well as academic, policy and industry expertise, 
these often draw upon interviews with investors of various kinds. 
 
Constraints are usually organised into one of three categories: financial and economic; 
regulatory and political; and technical. Some recent research also points at the role of 
perceptions and preconceptions in investment decisions in the renewable energy sector. 
In this section, we first review each category of constraints with respect to renewable 
energy investments in a general sense. The extent to which constraints in developing 
countries differ is then explored. 
 
3.1 Constraints to renewable energy investments worldwide 
 
3.1.1 Economic and financial constraints 
 
In most studies, economic and financial factors are the most important constraints on 
private sector investment. 
  
The economics of low carbon projects are often less attractive than those of their 
high carbon alternatives. One major reason is that the carbon externality is not yet 
adequately priced in many geographies, and there continue to be significant fossil 
fuel subsidies. 
(WWF 2011) 
 
As this quote suggests, the financial costs of renewables tend to be higher than fossil fuel 
alternatives. However, as the previous review of cost estimates suggests, renewable 
energy technologies can be the most economical solution for electricity generation in 
many cases when the right conditions are in place. Besides, the cost of renewable 
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technologies (i.e. the capital investment component) has fallen dramatically over the past 
few decades. The price of solar PV modules, for example, has fallen by more than 95 per 
cent since 1979 (IRENA 2012), but cell costs are minor elements in overall solar PV 
system costs. Wind turbines have seen cost reductions of similar magnitude. On the other 
side, the rapid fall in the cost of imported diesel engines from China has also had a 
disruptive effect in Africa. All in all, renewable energy remains a more expensive option 
than fossil fuel alternatives in many cases, although these differentials vary significantly 
as we have seen. 
 
Many studies see this cost differential as artificial, pointing out that the pollution costs of 
fossil fuels are not included in their price or ‘internalised’ (Stadelmann, Castro and 
Michaelowa 2011; IRENA 2012; Nelson and Pierpont 2013; Spratt, Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo 2013; OECD 2014). Many also highlight the fact that this is exacerbated by the 
large subsidies provided to fossil fuels in many countries. Globally, these have been 
estimated at US$522 billion in 2012 ( International Energy Agency 2013), double the 
entire renewable energy investments in the world in that year.  
 
Cost differentials are also driven by the high initial investment costs of renewables 
compared with fossil fuels. Capital investment comprises 80 per cent of the technology 
component of the LCOE for wind power projects, but only 15 per cent for gas (Nelson and 
Pierpont 2013). As a result, renewable energy investments require much larger up-front 
investment than is the case with fossil-fuel projects, which can act as a further constraint 
to investment by increasing the amount of finance that needs to be raised. 
 
Different classes of investor cite different constraints. For institutional investors (equity), 
the primary issue is that returns available from renewable energy investments are often 
not large enough relative to risk and relative to other places they can put their money: 
 
...financiers are concerned that insufficient returns will be generated given the 
risks involved in a project. This illustrates a key point that it’s not sufficient to 
create a return for investors; the return must be attractive relative to all other 
investment opportunities. Therefore, to stimulate institutional investors’ 
involvement in climate change finance, the returns expected on climate 
investments must be commensurate with perceived levels of risk and also 
competitive with the returns on normal business investments. 
(Parhelion 2010) 
 
Other institutional investors cite location specific constraints. Tax incentives are 
commonly used in the US to boost the returns available from renewable energy 
investments. US pension funds are tax-exempt, however, removing the benefits of such 
mechanisms (Nelson and Pierpont 2013). 
 
Bankers also cite the insufficiency of returns with respect to risk, suggesting that the 
revenue streams from renewable energy projects can be unpredictable (WWF 2011). With 
the debt financing provided by banks, this represents a significant investment risk. 
Conceptualising investment constraints as four different forms of risk, Spratt et al. (2013) 
also suggest that ‘economic risks’, where returns are too low relative to the perceived risk, 
is the principle barrier to renewable energy investment. This constraint is particularly 
acute when the aim is to provide energy services to poor people because effective 
demand (need backed by ability to pay) is too low and too widely spread geographically. 
 
From an economics and finance perspective, therefore, the primary constraints are: a) low 
returns relative to perceived risk; b) low returns relative to alternatives (due to cost 
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differentials, un-priced externalities, and fossil-fuel subsidies); and c) the relatively high 
fixed investment costs of renewable energy projects. 
 
3.1.2 Regulatory and political constraints 
 
For investors, many of the risks associated with renewable energy projects are regulatory 
or political in nature. While all infrastructure projects carry risks of this kind, these are 
particularly important with renewable energy. In order to attract investment, governments 
generally intervene to address problems with the underlying economics of many projects. 
In such circumstances, the economic viability of the project becomes dependent on the 
maintenance of government support. The high fixed investment costs of renewables 
amplifies these risks, as the bulk of the investment is made at the beginning of the project, 
with returns accumulating over the projects’ lifetime. The long-term nature of renewable 
energy projects make this problem worse still: 
 
...investors are most concerned with the apparent mismatch between the long-
term nature of capital commitments inherent in climate change financing and the 
relatively short time frame of climate change regulations. Investment horizons 
and/or capital commitment periods can range from 20 years for a reasonably sized 
renewable energy project to 50 years or more for a climate change adaptation-
related investment. Compare this with the duration of regulations that promote 
climate change investments. 
(Parhelion 2010) 
 
These concerns clearly have some foundation. Since the global financial crisis, and the 
pressure of government finances that resulted, many countries have reduced their 
subsidies for renewable energy projects. Given these policy-related risks, investors tend 
to demand higher returns for renewable energy projects, exacerbating the economic 
problems described above (Sullivan 2011). 
 
While this is the most important form of regulatory risk, there are other constraints to 
investment in this area. Rather than the removal or modification of policy, these relate to 
the presence of unhelpful regulations or policies. 
 
Other regulatory constraints specific to the energy sector include uncertainty regarding 
governmental renewable energy strategy and targets, limitations related to energy market 
liberalisation; uncertainties related to priority dispatch competitive landscape and price 
outlook; lack of well-designed regulations, processes and standard contracts (e.g. Power 
Purchase Agreements, PPAs) (Glemarec, Rickerson and Waissbein 2012). Institutional 
constraints occur when there is a lack of clear functional responsibility of different 
authorities for renewable energy project approvals or no clear recourse mechanisms 
(ibid). 
 
Some of these problems – such as those described in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
indicators are not specific to renewable energy investment, but are general constraints on 
private investment. Examples would be the administrative burden of establishing a 
business, contract enforcement or tax policy (World Bank 2011a). More generally, The 
OECD stresses the need for consistency across different areas of policy: 
 
Governments need to stand back and look across the entire range of signals they 
are sending to consumers, to producers and investors, to avoid incoherent and 
inconsistent policies, eliminate mixed messages when it comes to supporting 
renewable energy, and price carbon in a cost-effective way. In addition, neglecting 
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the consequences, sometimes unintended, of domestic energy policies in such 
areas as water, agriculture and food can undermine their effectiveness. 
(OECD 2014) 
 
To summarise, regulatory or political risks can constrain renewable energy investment in 
three ways. First, as project viability is often dependent upon government financing, 
investors face the risk that this support will not be maintained. Second, negotiating the 
existing regulatory and policy landscape can impose significant costs on investors. Third, 
contradictory or inconsistent policies in other areas can create unintended consequences. 
Each of these risks are likely to exacerbate the economic problems detailed above, 
making renewable energy projects less attractive to private investors. 
 
3.1.3 Technical constraints 
To a greater or lesser extent, renewable energy technologies, except hydro, remain 
relatively new. This directly affects the risks investors attach to different projects: 
 
The maturity or deployment of a given technology appears to be the dominant 
intrinsic factor that defines the overall risk perception for that technology. For 
example, there are significant uncertainties around the technical viability and 
performance of certain low-carbon electric generation technologies. Ultimately, 
these questions can...only be addressed through the relatively wide deployment of 
the technology, enabling its operation to be tested under a range of operating 
conditions and in a range of operating environments, thereby providing robust 
information on issues such as reliability (and maintenance costs), availability and 
equipment lifetimes. 
(Sullivan 2011) 
 
Table 3.1 groups technologies according to levels of technical risk. Some, such as 
onshore wind and solar PV are relatively mature, while others such as floating wave 
power remain quite new. 
 
Table 3.1 Technical risks associated with different forms of energy generation 
 
Low Medium High 
Hydro  
Solar PV 
Biogas 
Onshore wind 
Biomass 
New build nuclear 
Offshore wind 
Wave (fixed) 
Tidal stream 
Tidal barrage 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
coal 
CCS gas 
Wave (floating) 
Source: Sullivan (2011) 
 
Technologies that have not been deployed at scale, in a range of different environments, 
and over a protracted period of time are thus unproven. From an investment perspective, 
this creates uncertainty. Performance, in terms of the energy generation may be worse 
than anticipated. Resolving unanticipated technical problems generates additional costs, 
even if these are only ‘teething problems’. 
 
The lack of accurate resource assessments for all renewable sources and uncertainties 
about future supply (for bioenergy) are another important technical barrier (Glemarec et 
al. 2012). There are also technical constraints related to the integration of variable 
renewable energy resources in electrical power systems. Power generation technologies 
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can be classified in terms of whether they are variable, predictable/uncertain or 
controllable/uncontrollable. For instance conventional sources such as gas would be 
classed as non-variable, predictable and controllable given mechanical availability and 
fuel supply. Wind and solar PV however, would be classed as variable, uncertain and 
uncontrollable as their available output depends on the weather. Tidal stream generation 
is variable, predictable (it can be forecast many years ahead) and uncontrollable, whereas 
tidal barrages and some concentrated solar power plants are variable, predictable and 
semi-controllable due to intrinsic heat or water storage. The integration of large shares of 
time variable renewable energy resources is expected to result in higher system-
balancing costs. Intermittent renewable energy sources contribute less to capacity 
adequacy (capacity that can meet peak residual demand9) than flexible sources, many of 
which are fossil fuel based. Intermittent renewable energy sources may also require 
additional investments in transmission infrastructure if resources are remote from demand 
centres (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). However, IRENA (2013) 
argues that integration costs can be significantly reduced through proper system design 
and increased system flexibility, where additional storage is only needed when 
intermittent renewables reach 20-50 per cent of total system capacity. An extensive 
summary of technical constraints related to the integration of intermittent sources may be 
found in studies such as North American Electric Reliability Corporation (2010). 
 
From an investment perspective, the more untested the technology in question, the higher 
the technical risks and larger the impact on required returns.  
 
3.1.4 Behavioural constraints 
 
A new stream of literature builds upon behavioural finance and institutional theory to 
conclude that renewable technologies still suffer from biased perceptions and 
preconceptions that favour status quo over innovative alternatives. An analysis of the 
investment decisions of a large sample of European investors, for example, shows that 
priori beliefs about the technical adequacy of technologies and about the effectiveness of 
policy measures have a positive influence on investors’ willingness to back renewable 
energy projects and to diversify their portfolios (Masini and Menichetti 2013). However, 
confidence in technical adequacy has a much stronger impact than confidence in policy 
effectiveness, which the authors interpret as an indication that the proven reliability of a 
technology is a precondition for investing. Importantly, however, the study also shows that 
technological views are influenced more by a priori belief than by factual information. 
  
3.2 Constraints on renewable energy investment in developing countries 
 
In most instances, constraints on renewable energy investment in developing countries 
are the same as those described in the previous section, only more acute. There are also 
a small number of constraints that are particular to developing countries. 
 
3.2.1 Economic and financial constraints in developing countries  
 
The rapid decline in technology costs that we have seen in recent decades has led some 
to suggest that grid parity is achievable (Lilliestam, Battaglini et al. 2012). While a case 
can be made to support this for some technologies in some resource-rich locations in 
developed countries, this is not often the case for most renewable energy technologies in 
                                                     
9
 Defined as total demand minus generation from renewables. 
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developing countries. The reason is that hardware is only one component of total costs, 
as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1  Comparison of developed and developing country energy project 
costs  
 
Source: Adapted from Waissbein, Glemarec, Bayraktar and Schmidt (2013) 
 
Figure 3.1 compares the pre-tax LCOE for a generic onshore wind energy plant and a 
generic CCGT plant in a developed country and the same plants in a developing country. 
Looking at the developed country situation on the left-hand side of the figure, we can see 
that onshore wind energy costs 6.7 UScents/kWh, while gas is only slightly cheaper 
6.1UScents/kWh. The developing country picture is very different. Despite the fact that 
operating costs are somewhat less, wind costs are 40 per cent higher, while gas is only 6 
per cent more expensive to generate. 
  
These effects are driven by the higher cost of finance in developing countries and the 
capital-intensive nature of renewable energy investments. In the example above, the cost 
of developed country debt is assumed to be 5 per cent, compared with 10 per cent in 
developing countries. The figures for equity are 10 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. 
The reason why the cost differential in wind is so much greater than for gas is because of 
the capital intensive nature of the investment: most of the financing for wind has to be 
raised at the outset, so the fact that it is much more expensive in developing countries 
has a disproportionate impact on overall energy costs (Waissbein et al. 2013). 
 
It is certainly the case that finance is much more expensive in developing than developed 
countries. Indeed, in many low-income countries, the cost differential may be even greater 
than is assumed here, with equity investors seeking returns of 25 per cent or more (Spratt 
et al. 2013). 
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The cost of finance is a function of risk and return. As reflected in different sovereign 
credit ratings, the perception is that developing countries are riskier places to invest than 
developed countries. Generally speaking, the lower the income-level of a country, the 
riskier it is perceived to be, so that – as with individuals – the poorest pay the most for 
finance. In addition to being more expensive, there is less long-term finance in most 
developing countries. Wind projects in developed countries can now obtain loans of up to 
18 years maturity, which is close to a projects’ lifetime (Tan 2012). In developing 
countries, the typical loan maturity is less than half of this (Waissbein et al. 2013). 
 
As a result of the higher perceived risks, debt investors in developing countries demand a 
larger share of equity than is the norm, with debt equity ratios of 60/40 being common, 
compared to the normal 70/30 in developed countries (IRENA 2012). As equity is more 
expensive than debt, this serves to further inflate funding costs, and the scarcity of equity 
finance in most developing countries acts as a further constraint.10 Finally, revenues may 
also be depressed, as many countries keep the cost of power artificially low for 
developmental reasons (United Nations Environment Programme 2012). Many 
developing countries show a history of manipulation of electricity prices for political 
reasons, typically aimed at keeping prices artificially low hence damaging the financial 
sustainability of the sector (ibid). Additionally, many countries spend large amounts in 
fossil fuel subsidies which damage the competitiveness of renewable energy alternatives. 
 
Apart from this, limitations in utility’s credit quality and payment track record raise non-
payment risks. For example, in Kenya: 
 
investors view KPLC’s11 credit profile, and the overall risk of non-payment by the 
utility, as a serious impediment to arranging financing. Investors have been 
seeking to obtain, with varying success, government guarantees, support letters 
and derisking instruments such as MIGA political risk insurance to mitigate this 
risk. 
(Waissbein et al. 2013) 
 
To summarise, while the economics of renewable energy projects in developing countries 
are often challenging, the situation is worse in developing countries, and particularly acute 
in low-income environments. This is caused by: a) the capital intensive nature of 
renewable energy projects, which amplifies funding cost differentials; b) the higher level of 
perceived risk, which raises costs through the higher cost of finance and the larger share 
of equity in project’s finance structure; c) the lack of domestic debt-finance of suitable 
maturity and scarcity of equity finance, particularly private equity; d) low prices of 
electricity that prevent cost-recovery.  
 
3.2.2 Regulatory and political constraints in developing countries 
 
As measured by the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ surveys, the time and resource costs 
associated with regulation are often higher in developing than developed countries (World 
Bank 2011). The intricacies of negotiating access to domestic grids may also be more 
difficult, with incumbent energy producers attempting to protect their market positions 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2012). This is a particular feature of African 
power markets with uncertain allocation of responsibilities for power planning, ensuring 
                                                     
10
 Debt is cheaper than equity as, in the event of insolvency, debt investors are paid before equity investors. Also, in many 
cases, income from debt-interest is tax deductible, while equity dividends are not.  
11
 KPLC (Kenya Power and Lighting Company) owns and operates most of the electricity transmission and distribution 
system in the Kenya. 
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adequate and reliable supply and organising procurement processes across public 
institutions and with the private sector. Hybrid power markets, where the state-owned 
utility occupies a dominant market position and private sector participation compensates 
for the lack of public investment were the result of the ineffective power sector reform 
prescriptions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s (Eberhard, Rosnes, Shkaratan and 
Vennemo 2011). Reform involving utility unbundling and privatisation followed by 
wholesale and retail competition was impractical for the region, as most power systems 
were too small to support meaningful competition. In the resulting hybrid model 
monopolistic and vertically integrated power utilities have no incentives or flexibility to 
provide easy access to third parties (United Nations Environment Programme 2012). This 
model poses multiple policy, regulation, planning and procurement challenges. 
 
While such issues will increase costs and potentially constrain private investment, another 
significant risk is that government support will not be maintained, undermining the 
economic viability of projects. As described above, the economics of renewable energy 
investment make financial support essential. Given that these economics can be 
considerably worse in developing countries due to high financing costs, this support is 
even more needed. 
 
Credibility is key. It is simple for a government to announce a FIT [feed-in-tariff] at 
a suitable rate for a long time period. The question is whether this commitment will 
be met, especially in difficult times. Investors may take confidence from the 
presence of long-term renewable energy targets, but this also depends on the 
credibility of this commitment. 
(Spratt et al. 2013) 
 
While many developed country governments have reneged on commitments, investors 
generally assign more risk to governments from developing countries where sudden 
policy changes – not least in the energy sector – have not been uncommon: 
 
In South Africa, for example, investors began preparations for preliminary 
investments after a feed-in tariff was announced by the government, which was 
subsequently cancelled and replaced by an auction scheme. 
(IRENA 2012) 
 
In this example, the FiT was scrapped before the project began. A greater fear than policy 
inconsistency for investors is that that this will happen at a later stage, after the (very 
large) initial capital investment has been made. At the most extreme, investors may fear 
the expropriation of assets. As with the previous material considered, such risks tend to 
loom larger in lower-income countries, particularly those with a history of political 
instability. 
 
It is these concerns which largely explain the higher cost of finance in developing 
countries, where investors demand higher returns to compensate them for higher risks. 
The fact that renewable energy projects are dependent on government support makes 
them much higher risk than other investments in the same country, amplifying the cost 
differential with other forms of energy. This can make it difficult for governments to justify 
continued support for renewables, particularly as: 
 
“...many developing country populations lack an affordable and consistent basic 
energy supply, which can complicate the ability of the national government to 
justify a focus on renewable energy. 
(IRENA 2012) 
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This is particularly the case in Africa, where electrification is a much higher political 
priority than renewable energy or cogeneration (Tenenbaum 2014). 
 
3.2.3 Technical constraints in developing countries 
 
Developing countries face the same technical constraints described above with newer, 
untested technologies carrying more risks than more established forms of energy 
generation. Other technical constraints are particular to lower-income countries, however. 
From a connectivity perspective, technical constraints include: lack of standards for the 
integration of intermittent, de-centralised renewable energy sources into the grid; limited 
experience of the utility or grid operator with intermittent sources which prevents an 
appropriate system design enabling minimisation of system balancing costs; lack of 
readily available transmission lines from the renewable energy source to load centers; 
and delays in timely completion of these (Glemarec et al. 2012). For example, in the case 
of Mongolia: 
 
With coal dominating the country’s energy mix, investors comment on the 
transmission company’s clear lack of experience with wind energy. Investors also 
raise additional concerns regarding overall grid stability due to the Mongolian 
grid’s antiquated, Soviet-era technology. Another barrier is the lack of a public grid 
code for wind, without which manufacturers have been prevented from tailoring 
turbines. 
(Waissbein et al. 2013) 
 
As well as constraints caused by problems with physical infrastructure (i.e. lack of roads 
or transmission lines), many developing countries suffer from local knowledge and 
experience gaps with respect to project design, construction, operation and maintenance 
and financial structuring, particularly for immature sectors such as renewables. Investors 
may find that there aren’t any local firms that can offer construction and maintenance 
services or any local staff that can operate the plants. The lack of local manufacture of 
hardware would require that all parts are imported, which would add to the time and cost 
of repairs: 
 
There is less experience with project finance structures, limited equipment 
operations and maintenance expertise, and a greater need for technology transfer 
support. Bankers often do not understand renewable energy technologies and are 
unwilling to approve financing due to an inability to assess the risk of the project. 
(IRENA 2012) 
 
To summarise, renewable energy investments face three types of constraint: 
economic/financial; regulatory/political; and technical. In each case, these constraints are 
more severe in developing countries, which also face technical constraints that do not 
arise in developed country contexts. 
 
As well as being harder to deliver logistically, renewable energy projects in developing 
countries are perceived to be riskier. Consequently, investors demand very high returns to 
compensate for these risks, making it much harder for projects to be economically viable. 
To offset this, tariffs need be set very high, and/or government support needs to be 
proportionally larger than is the case in developed countries (Spratt et al. 2013). Given 
poverty levels in many developing countries and the limited ability of governments to 
maintain financial support at the levels required, it may be difficult to justify renewable 
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energy projects in the absence of mechanisms to address these constraints and alter 
these dynamics. 
 
3.3 Ranking of constraints  
 
Two of the studies that have been reviewed attempt to rank investment constraints 
according to their importance for investors.  
The UNDP’s de-risking framework, for example, starts by identifying barriers and 
associated risks and then quantifies the impact of different risks categories on financing 
costs for a specific country (Waissbein et al. 2013). This is done by comparing the 
financing cost of a best-class investment environment (for example wind energy in 
Germany) with that of a developing country, with the additional cost being the element 
requiring ‘derisking’. Each barrier’s contribution to this additional cost is based on the 
probability of the barrier occurring and financial impact if it occurs. Estimates on these 
parameters are derived from interviews with equity and debt investors. 
 
The framework is applied to four case studies involving onshore wind energy in Kenya, 
Mongolia, Panama and South Africa. Figure 3.2 presents the results of this exercise for 
Kenya. ‘Power market risk’ – resulting from a lack of coordination between Governmental 
bodies with responsibility over the power market and deficiencies and uncertainties in the 
PPA with the Kenyan utility – has the highest estimated impact on financing costs. Grid 
integration risk is also significant due to weaknesses in grid management and a lack of 
skills in the local utility. Potential for non-payment by the Kenyan utility creates high 
counterparty risk. 
 
Figure 3.2  Quantification of the impact of barriers and associated risks on 
increased financing costs for onshore wind energy in Kenya 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Waissbein et al. (2012) 
 
In Mongolia, the lack of long-term targets for wind create uncertainty for investors, while 
regulations are flawed due to lack of experience of the Government and utility in wind 
energy. The process to obtain a PPA is also lengthy and non-transparent. For other risks, 
the transmission company lacks experience in the integration of intermittent sources and 
there are concerns over grid stability due to obsolete technologies. As in Kenya, concerns 
over the utility’s ability to pay power generators are also a factor. 
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Panama presents a different picture, with counterparty, political and currency risks 
considered low. Lack of knowledge of wind energy by government actors, the novelty of 
grid management for wind and lack of coordination between government bodies during 
permitting processes are seen as the major sources of risk. 
 
Finally, in South Africa currency/macro-economic risk and power market risk are the 
largest contributors to an increased cost of finance. Investors show concerns about the 
difficulty of access to the market for IPPs, as well as a tendering process that experiences 
significant delays and encourages aggressive bidding and unsustainable low prices. With 
PPAs denominated in local currency, the historical volatility of the Rand is also an issue. 
 
Another source on the relative importance of different barriers comes from Standard& 
Poor's Ratings Services and Parhelion Underwriting Ltd, a UK-based specialist insurer, in 
2010. Participants in a roundtable discussion from multilateral agencies, development 
banks, investment banks, the insurance industry, policy think tanks, and institutional 
investors were asked to identify, and score for probability and severity, the barriers that 
prevent investment by institutional investors in climate change finance. 
 
Risks with the highest probability and severity were: longevity, risk/reward imbalance, 
transaction cost risk, human and operational risk, economic risk, and commodity price 
volatility. Longevity risk relates to the mismatch between long-term capital commitments 
and short term climate change regulations. The risk/reward imbalance is insufficient 
returns compared with other investment opportunities, for a given level of risk. 
 
While the most severe risks were unexpected policy changes, institutional and property 
rights, and enforcement risks, the roundtable did not perceive these as highly probable, 
as the event did not focus in developing countries. Given that the probability of these 
events occurring would be considered much higher in a low income context, we can 
reasonably increase their weighing for the purposes of this research. This is fundamental, 
as it is not simply a matter of investors adjusting returns expectations to price in additional 
risks. Rather, there is a tendency to avoid altogether countries with a history of these 
risks, as shown by Africa’s struggle to attract interest in Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects. The need for stable and predictable policy regimes for renewable energy 
investment, which are credibly protected from political interference, would seem an 
essential precondition for large-scale private investment. 
 
4 Policies to address constraints 
 
In the previous chapter the main constraints to increasing investment in renewable energy 
were organised into three categories: economic and financial; regulatory and political; and 
technical/project-specific. In this part of the review, we examine policies and tools that 
have been used, or proposed, to address these constraints. 
 
Broadly, we have organised constraints and policies according to the nature of the risk 
that investors face, following the same categorisation as in the chapter on constraints: 
economic, regulatory or technical. Before examining interventions under these categories, 
it should be noted that other formulations are possible. One would be to organise 
according to types of investor or asset class. Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors 
(DBCCAs), for example, explore how to improve the risk and return characteristics of 
renewable energy investment in the following categories: private equity/venture capital; 
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infrastructure (project finance); public equity; fixed income; carbon overlay; and 
quantitative risk and return (Deutsche-Bank 2011). 
 
The rationale for such a categorisation is that different types of investors have different 
approaches to risk and return, which partly reflect the fact that they enter and exit the 
project life-cycle at different stages. As a result, interventions to adjust risk and return 
issues need to be targeted carefully: 
 
...the return investors look for partly reflects the nature of the asset classes and 
are commensurate with the risks inherent in each asset class. Despite recent 
volatility, the return potential for public equities can be significant and since the 
end of 2006, clean-tech equities have outperformed the MSCI World, where 
investors are looking for secular movements in a variety of industries across the 
climate change universe. The Private Equity and Venture Capital asset class also 
continues to show opportunity for capital deployment and exit opportunities to 
strategic buyers and into the IPO market. More measured returns, yet with lower 
risk, will come from infrastructure markets, where returns are in the low single 
digits, but have a more secure yield embedded into the return. Investors can seek 
out strong risk-adjusted returns from the climate change tilted fixed income asset 
class, which can act as a hedge against further development expansion of carbon 
markets. And finally, investors can deploy a carbon overlay strategy using carbon 
offset credits to hedge their carbon price risk at a portfolio level. 
Deutsche-Bank (2011: 7) 
 
In the quote above, DBCCAs, describe these considerations as they appeared in 2011. 
As well as giving a flavour of market sentiment, the quote highlights some interesting 
distinctions between developed and developing countries. While infrastructure 
investments (e.g. renewable energy facilities) may be considered low-risk/low-return 
investments in development markets, this is unlikely to be the case in most developing 
countries. As we saw in the previous chapter, higher return expectations in developing 
countries create a severe constraint on leveraging investment. 
 
As well as the way that different investors view risk and return, another consideration is 
the type of financing used. The UNDP highlight three important distinctions in this regard: 
 
Corporate finance vs. project structures. If a corporate finance structure is 
taken, a bank will typically lend on the strength of the business’ balance sheet, 
and the cost of debt is less likely to price in the specific risks faced by the 
renewable energy investment. If a project finance structure is taken, the only 
collateral a bank can have recourse to is the underlying assets of the investment. 
In this case, a bank is likely to perform detailed due diligence on the investment 
itself, and in turn will price in the various risks faced by the investment. Core vs. 
non-core investments. If the investment is a non-core activity, the risks 
associated with the investment are less likely to affect financing costs. A common 
example of non-core activities in this context are energy efficient investments. As 
an illustration, an upgrade of an inefficient industrial boiler in a textile factory may 
simply use a cost of financing associated with the factory’s core activity (textile 
manufacturing). Unsophisticated vs. sophisticated investors. Generally, the 
more experienced and sophisticated the investor, the more capable the investor is 
of pricing in the particular risks. So, for example, an inexperienced IPP investing 
its own equity may underestimate the uncertainty associated with certain risks, 
resulting in a low cost of equity and overly aggressive bidding in a PPA-based 
bidding process...commercial banks in an immature domestic financial sector may 
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not be fully comfortable with investments related to renewable energy 
technologies, resulting in a conservatively priced high cost of debt. 
(Waissbein et al. 2013) 
 
When exploring how to remove the barriers to different types of investment it is clearly 
sensible to take account of the type of investor that is required, and the nature of the 
appropriate financing mix. While the following analysis looks at constraints in terms of 
risks that face all investors, it is important to bear in mind that these risks do not affect all 
investors equally, and also do not apply equally in different forms of finance, asset 
classes, or investment mixes. With these caveats in mind, we first consider policies to 
address economic and financial constraints to investment. A summary table of policy 
instruments is provided as an appendix to this report. 
 
4.1 Policies to address economic and financial constraints 
 
Often the most challenging barriers to increasing private investment in renewable energy 
production are economic and/or financial: economic, in that the economic cost of 
renewables (e.g. the LCOE) is often not competitive with fossil fuels; financial, in that 
even when this is not the case, the nature of renewable energy financing, combined with 
the high returns expectations of investors with respect to developing countries, may 
undermine the economic viability of projects. 
 
These seem to be rather crude generalisations: why do people invest in coal; what has 
happened to investment in large hydro (the state did this when its test discount rate was 
less than 5 per cent, but the private sector is not interested when the project lifetime is so 
long – this ‘failure of capital markets’ to invest in infrastructure was the reason Keynes 
gave for the creation of the World Bank. 
 
Historically, the recommended solution to the economic constraint to renewables has 
been to increase the price of fossil fuel energy, so as to better reflect the costs of carbon 
emissions. In many developing countries, this requires phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. 
There are also two main options to increase the relative price of fossil fuels: price-based 
(i.e. carbon taxes) and quantity-based (i.e. ‘cap and trade’). In the former, the price is 
known but the impact on carbon emissions uncertain. That is, a carbon tax may be 
designed to achieve a particular reduction in emissions, but the actual emission reduction 
will be somewhat uncertain. Conversely, under a quantity-based system such as ‘cap and 
trade’, the quantity of emissions reductions is fixed, but the price at which these trade – 
i.e. the market price of carbon – is uncertain. From an economics perspective, the two 
approaches are equivalent: the level of carbon tax to achieve a given level of emissions 
reduction, should be the same as the price of carbon that would result in a carbon market 
where the same emissions reduction was imposed with a cap (Spratt 2009). 
 
It is beyond the scope of this review to consider the relative merits of carbon taxes versus 
‘cap & trade,’12 but this debate remains largely academic anyway. Although examples of 
carbon markets exist – most notably the European Trading System (ETS) – these remain 
the exception. The workings of the ETS have been much criticised, with carbon price 
levels far below those needed to incentivise a shift from fossil fuels.13 The global carbon 
market remains a dream, which even its most ardent admirers have stopped promoting. 
                                                     
12
 For a discussion of the economics, see Goulder, L. H. and A. Schein (2013). For an argument in favour of carbon taxes 
that takes account of political and practical considerations, see Hansen, J. E. (2009).  
13
 For a discussion of price drivers in the ETS, and an agent-based simulation of reform proposals, see Richstein, Chappin 
and de Vries (2014).  
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Most countries have taxes on high carbon emitting activities such as fuel use, but 
vanishingly few tax carbon directly. Interestingly the UK was the first country to introduce 
a ‘floor’ to carbon prices 2013, which is levied on large energy producers, and is 
effectively a tax on carbon. The rationale was that the ‘floor’ would rise progressively, 
performing the same function as a well-functioning carbon market. Starting at £16 per ton, 
the original framework saw carbon prices rise annually to reach £30 per ton by 2020. 
Faced with opposition to rising energy prices, however, the UK Chancellor announced in 
the 2014 Budget that the price would be fixed at the 2015 level (i.e. £18) until 2020. 
 
This highlights the difficulties in implementing carbon taxes that work – i.e. provide a 
sufficient disincentive to fossil fuel energy use. Public opinion is likely to object to the 
rising energy prices that result, as are energy intensive producers. This is particularly the 
case where the tax is implemented differently between countries. Given their economic 
equivalence, cap & trade systems face the same issues: low carbon prices in the ETS 
partly result from the oversupply of credits following lobbying from European industry. 
 
For the foreseeable future, therefore, we look set to remain in a second-best world where 
carbon prices are not widespread and other measures are put in place to increase the 
return or lower the risk of renewable energy as compared to fossil fuel alternatives. 
 
(i) Policies to boost returns 
 
The most commonly used – and proposed – policy to boost returns is a feed-in-tariff (FiT) 
at a premium rate for a guaranteed length of time (Bloomberg New Energy Finance2010; 
World Bank 2011b; International Finance Corporation 2013; Waissbein et al. 2013). There 
are several definitions of FiT but here will follow the same definition as Waissbein et al. 
(2013) as ‘mechanisms that provide renewable energy generators with a power purchase 
agreement (PPA) ensuring a fixed long-term price for power and guaranteed access to 
the electricity grid’. An above-market price premium is not an essential characteristic of 
FiT, but it is often the case when there is a need to increase the return on investment to 
ensure financial viability of renewable energies. 
 
FiTs with an above market price premium have three distinct advantages. First, they 
reduce market access risk by ensuring access and incorporating must-take requirements. 
Second, they remove uncertainty over future price movements by a guaranteed price over 
periods of 15-25 years with built in automatic inflation adjustments. Third, they address 
cost differentials between renewables and fossil fuels by paying renewable providers a 
premium rate. They can also remove currency risk if they are set in foreign currency, 
usually USD. These advantages can generate dynamic growth in installed renewable 
capacity, particularly where access to the FiT is quite widely available. Here the growth in 
renewable distributed capacity in European countries may offer interesting lessons for 
developing countries.14 
 
It is important to get the design of FiTs right, as once the share of renewable energy 
generation becomes significant FiT can become unsustainable for national budgets. The 
use of FiTs may not be appropriate in countries with very low electricity access rates, 
where underinvestment affects electricity generation and transmission as a whole. 
Indeed, using limited national resources to provide a price premium for renewables or 
                                                     
14
 For a review of different approaches to regulating distributed energy in Europe see Ropenus and Skytte (2005); Future 
Power Systems, 2005 International Conference on, IEEE.For the specific case of Germany’s promotion of wind and solar 
PV see Luetkenhorst and Pegels (2014). 
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transferring the extra costs to the final consumer, instead of supporting least-cost capacity 
could undermine efforts to reduce energy poverty. In countries where renewable energy 
technologies are more competitive with conventional energy, the introduction of relatively 
low FiT could stabilise or even reduce prices, by reducing the risk of the energy portfolio 
as a whole and providing higher certainty to investors (Haselip 2011). 
 
Numerous studies have explored the economics of this for developed countries, 
proposing frameworks to create ‘optimal’ FiTs with respect to desired levels of capacity 
expansion, efficiency improvements, innovation and other policy objectives (Klein, Held, 
Ragwitz, Resch and Faber 2007; Lesser and Su 2008; Couture and Gagnon 2010). 
Politics also matter, however. FiTs need to adjust over time to changing costs – i.e. as the 
costs of renewable energy generation fall, price premiums need to fall accordingly. If this 
is not built into the framework, public opinion may turn against FiTs, undermining their 
political sustainability (Deutsche-Bank 2011). 
 
PPA-based auctions or tendering processes are an alternative mechanism to ensure grid 
access and a guaranteed long-term electricity price. The main difference is that FiT prices 
are administratively determined, whereas in competitive tenders developers bid for the 
right to sell electricity at a particular price. Broadly, FiTs tend to be more favourable for 
project developers, whereas competitive tenders carry more advantages for the 
administration as they drive down the price premium required. However, pressure on 
prices can result in unrealistically low bids that do not result in projects being developed. 
In this case, they can make it difficult for a country to reach its renewable energy capacity 
targets.15 FiTs are relatively simple for project developers, whereas auctions usually carry 
higher transaction costs and result in clusters of big developers (Whittaker 2012). 
 
As well as increasing revenues, the other way of boosting returns is to lower costs. This 
can take a number of forms. First, the cost of upfront fixed capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
can be subsidised. As we have seen, this represents a disproportionately large proportion 
of total renewable energy project costs, so that targeted subsidies at this point in the 
project life-cycle could also have a disproportionate impact on financial viability. Deutsche 
Bank describe the impact this had on the viability of wind energy in the US: 
 
One of the most successful outcomes of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was the Section 1603 Treasury Cash Grant program, where 
project developers were provided with cash grants of 30% of project costs to help 
pay the high upfront capital cost of renewable energy projects, making some 
‘marginal’ projects economical. Importantly, the program also filled the market void 
left from the reduction in tax equity capacity due to the 2008 financial crisis. As of 
February 2011, some 83% of all section 1603 grants were directed to wind 
projects. 
(Deutsche Bank 2011: 29) 
 
Another way of reducing costs and boosting returns is via project finance. Most directly, 
loans can be provided on concessional terms directly from institutions such as national or 
multilateral development banks (WorldBank 2011b; International Finance Corporation 
2013). Less directly, development finance institutions can supply credit lines to 
commercial banks on favourable terms to fund renewable energy projects ( Agence 
Française de Développement 2010 ). 
 
                                                     
15
 See Spratt (2014) for an examination of this issue in the evolution of wind and solar energy in China and India.  
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More generally, development finance institutions may channel funds to project developers 
on the terms which they borrow. As these institutions are generally backed by sovereigns 
– either individually in the case of national institutions, or collectively for multilateral 
institutions – they have high credit ratings, and are able to borrow more cheaply than 
private financial institutions.16  
 
An example is the ‘Climate Awareness Bonds’ issued by the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), with the money ring-fenced for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, in 
the EU and developing countries. The EIB is thus able to provide finance for projects on 
better terms than private developers, or developing country sovereigns, could have 
obtained. 
 
A more direct example is the IFC’s ‘B loan’ structure, where the IFC effectively borrows 
money on behalf of a syndicate of banks. The advantages of the structure are described 
as follows: 
 
When an IFC loan includes financing from the market through the B Loan 
structure, IFC retains a portion of the loan for its own account (the "A Loan"), and 
sells participations in the remaining portion to participants (the "B Loan"). The 
borrower signs a single Loan Agreement with IFC, and IFC signs a Participation 
Agreement with the participants. IFC is the sole contractual lender for the 
borrower...The A/B Loan structure allows participants to fully benefit from IFC's 
status as a multilateral development institution. All payments including principal, 
interest, and fees gain the advantages of IFC's Preferred Creditor Status...As a 
result, IFC cannot be paid in full until all participants are paid in full. Similarly, a 
default to a participant would be a default to IFC. 
(International Finance Corporation n.d.) 
 
As well as obtaining finance on better terms, the B loan structure protects banks in the 
syndicate from the risk of default. Given that no borrower has ever defaulted on a loan to 
the IFC, this is a very valuable benefit (Spratt and Collins 2012). While not strictly 
‘concessional’, therefore, these types of structure directly lower the cost of financing, and 
so boost project returns. 
 
(ii) Policies to reduce risk 
In this section we are concerned with policies that address financial risks – regulatory or 
political risk are covered in the next section. In practice, of course, the distinction is less 
clear: political and regulatory risk do affect the financing costs and return expectations of 
projects. What we are concerned with in this section, however, are policies that are 
designed to directly mitigate the financial and economic risks of projects. 
 
One way of looking at this is by financing type. Project financing for renewable energy is a 
mix of debt and equity, and risk mitigation mechanisms apply differently to each. For debt, 
the principle risk mitigation tool is to guarantee some proportion of the loan in the event of 
default. Guarantees are extensively used by bilateral multilateral agencies in practice 
(Agence Française de Développement 2010 ; WorldBank 2011b; International Finance 
Corporation 2013), and supported by many commentators in the literature (Caperton 
2010; Brown 2011; Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Spratt 2012).  
 
                                                     
16
 For a discussion of this with respect to infrastructure finance in developing countries, see Spratt and Collins (2012).  
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The cost of capital in many developing countries is higher because of the perception 
of higher political or economic risk. Some investors may not be prepared to accept 
these risks at all and others may demand higher returns for doing so. But with 
underwriting from developed countries, more investors may be attracted to clean 
energy in developing countries and the costs of borrowing may be lowered. 
 
Caperton (2010: 3) describes the rationale. The same author suggests that the use of 
guarantees has a high ‘leverage ratio’ of 6-10, implying that the use of public financing is 
able to leverage between 6 and 10 times its level of private finance. As well as attracting 
private finance through underwriting risk, the impact of guarantees is multiplied as, unlike 
with the direct provision of loans, they are only used in the event of default. Where no 
such problems arise, the public funds are retained and can be recycled as another 
guarantee. For this reason, well targeted and calibrated guarantees can be preferable to 
‘one-off’ mechanisms in terms of maximising long-term impact. 
 
In cases where a high level of risk prevents access to private funding, a guarantee 
can be more useful than a grant or subsidy. If the (perceived) risk turns out to be real, 
the guarantee turns into a subsidy; if the risk does not occur during implementation, 
the money will not be spent. 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2006) 
 
Debt providers also face foreign exchange risk when debt is provided in non-domestic 
currency, as is generally the case for developing countries. The problem is that project 
revenues are denominated in domestic currency, so a potential currency mismatch is 
created. If the debt is provided in US dollars, for example, and the domestic currency falls 
in value relative to the dollar, real debt repayment costs rise proportionally. This is a 
perennial issue in developing countries, where large currency devaluations are far from 
uncommon: from 3 July 2013 to 3 July 2014, for example, the Ghanaian Cedi lost 32 per 
cent of its value against the US dollar. The debt service costs – as well as the principle – 
of dollar-denominated debt in Ghana has therefore risen by a third in one year.  
 
Cost movements on this scale can undermine the financial viability of even the most 
robust project. Given the high CAPEX costs of renewable energy, this is a particularly 
important issue. An important policy solution has been the use of foreign exchange 
liquidity facilities. Brown describes the approach as follows: 
 
“A foreign exchange liquidity facility can help reduce the risks associated with 
borrowing money in a different currency by creating a line of credit that can be 
drawn on when the project needs money and repaid when the project has a 
financial surplus. If a local currency is devalued and the project developer cannot 
afford the debt repayments, the developer can draw down funds in the liquidity 
facility and repay either when the exchange rate improves or the project can 
increase revenues. The cost of such a foreign exchange liquidity facility is 
expected to be cheaper than either a loan guarantee or policy insurance. 
(Brown 2011: 3) 
 
As with guarantees, the mechanism is only triggered under certain conditions. Unlike 
guarantees, however, there is also the possibility of ‘upside’, where an appreciation of the 
currency would see inflows to the liquidity facility. This explains why it would be more cost 
effective over time, assuming that currency movements are not all in the same direction. 
As well as renewable energy projects, therefore, such mechanisms are thus widely 
promoted for infrastructure investments generally in developing countries (World Bank 
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2011b; Griffith-Jones et al. 2012; International Finance Corporation 2013; Waissbein et al. 
2013). 
 
An obvious solution to this problem is to obtain debt in domestic currency. For most 
developing countries – particularly smaller, lower-income countries – this has often not 
been a viable option, as domestic creditors are generally unable or unwilling to provide 
finance on the scale required, and external lenders unwilling to take on the currency risk. 
For larger, emerging economies with growing domestic bond markets and increasingly 
large banks, this is becoming an increasingly feasible and desirable financing mode, 
however, and some donor initiatives have explicitly been designed to address this in low-
income countries.17 
 
While (non-domestic) equity investors also face currency risks – though to a lesser extent 
– their other risks are different. The issue is not risk of default, but of a significant 
reduction in project profitability, or in the extreme insolvency and the loss of the invested 
capital. While this risk cannot be eliminated it can be mitigated. Subordinated equity 
funds, for example, create different classes of equity. Bodies like development finance 
institutions buy the subordinated tranche of equity, so that in the event of insolvency, the 
private equity investors are paid first (Brown 2011; World Bank 2011b). Caperton (2010) 
estimates that the leverage ratio of subordinated equity funds is 2, such that a tranche of 
subordinated equity is able to leverage twice as much commercial equity. 
 
Another option to attract equity investors is the ‘pledge fund’: 
 
Some projects are too small for equity investors to consider, or simply cannot access 
sufficient equity, despite having a strong internal rate of return (IRR). If provision of 
equity is the primary limiting factor, an equity capital ‘pledge’ fund may be appropriate. 
In this model, public finance sponsors (which could be developed country 
governments or international financial institutions) provide a small amount of equity to 
anchor and encourage much larger pledges from private investors, such as sovereign 
wealth funds, large private equity firms and pension funds. 
(Brown 2011: 3) 
 
As described in the quote above, the use of public ‘seed’ equity capital can act as the 
founding ‘anchor’ for such funds. There are a number of important potential benefits of 
this mechanism. First, it sends a signal to private investors that particular forms of 
investment are potentially viable. Second, public investors may undertake project due 
diligence, which both reduces risk for private investors – by weeding out overly risky 
projects – but also saves them the significant costs associated with this process. More 
generally, the difficulty, and expense, of project preparation is well understood by 
development agencies,18 though many would argue that insufficient resources are 
devoted to addressing this issue (Bhattacharya, Romani and Stern 2012). 
 
As well as financial risks, ‘anchor’ investors also play an important role in mitigating 
regulatory and political risk, which is the subject of the next section.  
 
                                                     
17
 The Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) has a facility dedicated to supporting the development of domestic 
currency debt markets in low-income countries. GuarantCo provides guarantees to lenders to support local currency 
lending for infrastructure, which both prevents currency risk and also promotes the development of domestic financial 
sectors: www.pidg.org/what-we-do/companies/guarantco  
18
 The PIDG, for example, also has a Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) that assists with project development. 
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4.2 Policies to address regulatory and political constraints 
 
As described above, feed-in-tariffs and competitive tenders can address constraints 
related to market access and price uncertainty by guaranteeing access to the grid and a 
long-term price for renewable energy generation. Most renewable energy projects also 
require these cornerstone instruments for financial viability. However, it is one thing for a 
country to announce a FiT and another for investors to believe this will be honoured for its 
formal duration. This can be a major issue for investors in developing countries, 
particularly those with a history of regulatory policy change. 
 
As with financial risk, different mechanisms have been developed for debt and equity 
investors. For the former, the equivalent of a loan guarantee is policy insurance: ‘Low 
carbon policy risk cover’, for example, could be offered as insurance against the 
prospects of developing country governments discontinuing support policies such as FITs 
(VividEconomics 2009). There are a number of ways this could be implemented. The first 
is through a standard insurance policy: 
 
As most projects depend on one or more specific policies to be profitable, public 
finance can be used to insure investors against the risk of policy uncertainty. This 
can be done through conventional insurance bought by the public finance 
institution to cover the risk of policy change. For example, if the policy is a feed-in 
tariff to support renewable electricity projects, the public finance institution could 
buy an insurance policy against the feed-in tariff being abandoned or 
reduced...This type of tool is most likely to succeed in countries with strong 
regulatory systems and institutions, and where certain policies are already in place 
or under development. 
(Brown 2011: 5) 
 
A minimum level of institutional quality would be required for this be feasible. An 
alternative would be for official agencies to purchase a ‘put option’ from the energy 
producer, whereby they would guarantee to buy the energy generated at a specified, 
minimum price, if the FiT were revoked or substantially reduced (Caperton 2010). 
 
Political risk is akin to regulatory risk, only more extreme. Here the risks are of an 
expropriation of assets, or of the social and political situation becoming so unstable that it 
is impossible for the project to function. Once again, insurance is the primary tool. This 
may be provided by public agencies, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA)19, which is an arm of the World Bank, or from private political risk 
providers such as Lloyds of London.20 
 
The primary means of mitigating regulatory and political risk for equity investors is through 
co-investment. As described above, no borrower has defaulted on a loan from the IFC, 
presumably as this would jeopardise their wider relationship with the World Bank Group. 
Co-investing with a multilateral or bilateral agency from an important donor will also make 
it less likely that regulations will be radically changed, or more extreme political risks 
come to fruition (Spratt and Collins 2012). This insurance, or ‘political umbrella’ is a key 
reason why the ‘anchor funds’ described above are so important. Recent examples are 
the IFC’s Catalyst Fund, the UK Department for International Development’s CP3 Fund, 
                                                     
19
 www.miga.org/  
20
 www.lloyds.com/redirect-pages/risk_locator/political_risks_insurance  
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both of which aim to leverage commercial private equity into renewable energy in 
developing countries by co-investing. 
 
A related form of risk relates to the way policy is formulated and implemented in the first 
place, not the risk that it will be changed or revoked. Waissbein et al. describe this in the 
context of policy ‘derisking’: 
 
Policy derisking instruments seek to remove the underlying barriers that are the 
root causes of risks. These instruments include, for example, support for 
renewable energy policy design, institutional capacity building, resource 
assessments, grid connection and management, and skills development for local 
operations and maintenance (O&M). 
(Waissbein et al. 2013: 12) 
 
Other commentators also stress the importance of providing significant support for 
renewable energy policy design (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2011; International 
Finance Corporation 2013). 
 
4.3 Policies to address technical (and capacity) and project-specific 
constraints 
 
Investors’ perceptions of risk are higher with less mature technologies, and/or where 
these technologies are deployed in new settings. The development of local technology 
standards can reduce uncertainty about the quality of equipment. Besides, co-investing 
may help to mitigate this by protecting investors from some of the technical risks from new 
technologies. In this case, the appropriate mechanism would be to create a fund with 
public and private funds to invest in promising new technologies: 
 
One possibility is to allow private investors to buy out the government share of the 
fund at a nominal return on capital once the technological risks of the overall 
portfolio have been reduced with time, experience and financial progress 
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2010) 
 
While such a mechanism might work well in a developed country, it is unlikely that 
investors would be prepared to invest in untried technologies in developing countries. The 
model could be adapted, however, and made more applicable to the specific technical 
risks in developing countries. 
 
Technical constraints arising from the integration renewable generators into a power 
system can be addressed through a number of methods, mechanisms and policies:21  
 
 Design renewable generators to be more grid friendly through offering voltage 
support, reactive power regulation, fault ride through, active power control, 
frequency regulation, inertial response and limiting fault currents. 
 
 Additional flexible generation and storage to maintain the instantaneous balance 
of supply and demand and additional frequency/voltage regulation and support. 
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 See International Energy Corporation (2012) 
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 Additional network upgrades to connect remote wind and solar generation to load 
centres. This can be achieved with new lines, FACTS and raising the voltage 
level. 
 
 Improved modelling of generation and weather forecasting to mitigate the 
unpredictability of the power output from wind and solar. 
 
 Coordination of the control of clustered renewable generators. 
 
 Policies to strengthen the transmission company’s operational performance and 
grid management, so that it can cope with the new, flexible generation. 
 
 Formulation of a grid code for new renewable energy technologies. 
 
Technical constraints arising from uncertainty about the size and cost of the renewable 
energy resource can be addressed through capacity building and public funding for the 
preparation of renewable energy resources assessments and pre-feasibility studies 
(Waissbein et al. 2013). 
 
The lack of a skilled local workforce may require a general improvement of the education 
system, but specific renewable energy skills can be reinforced through training and 
apprenticeship programmes and the support to specialist programmes at local 
universities. 
 
Project and operational risk is distinct from technical risk, but may be a significant factor in 
some developing countries. There are two main options to address this issue. First, as 
with regulation, insurance can be supplied to cover for operational risk. Given their 
longstanding experience with this form of insurance, some have suggested that private 
insurers may be able to offer this at lower cost than the public sector ( Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 2011). The second option is to mitigate project risk directly. Some 
development finance institutions – such as Norfund, for example – work directly with 
Norwegian construction and maintenance firms, which have particular experience in 
delivering hydropower projects (Griffith-Jones et al. 2012). 
 
4.4 The policy mix 
 
The previous sub-sections have considered policy interventions to address risk in 
isolation. In practice, however, barriers to investment are likely to be multiple, and policies 
to address these will thus also be multiple. Waissbein et al. (op cit) illustrate how a mix of 
public policies can be built upon a ‘cornerstone instrument’ such as a FiT. 
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Figure 4.1  Public instrument selection for large scale renewable energy 
 
Source: Adapted from Waissbein et al. (2013) 
 
The same authors also describe the complexities involved in finding the right policy mix: 
 
Decision-makers...have to identify the different stakeholders associated with each 
investment barrier, and closely understand the varying interests that have resulted 
in the barrier coming about. The appropriateness of different public measures to 
address these barriers needs to be assessed: some public instruments may be 
less effective and require a longer amount of time to take effect in some countries 
than others. For example, institutional strengthening within ministries may be an 
important precursor to a well-designed FiT regime. While a public instrument may 
be effective, the public expenditures required to achieve this might be 
disproportionate and therefore politically unbearable. Determining the ex-ante cost 
of public instruments involves multiple, complex assumptions. Direct financial 
incentives for renewable energy are becoming particularly controversial in 
industrial countries and are likely to prove even more problematic in developing 
countries. 
(Waissbein et al. 2013) 
 
The ultimate aim of this research is to develop a robust methodology to enable policy-
makers to chart a path through this complex labyrinth. Identifying the best policies and 
policy mix is only the first part of the process, however. To have the predicted effect these 
policies need to be implemented, and this is a not a technical question, but a matter of 
political economy. Accordingly, the next chapter explores the literature in this vital area. 
 
 
5 Who drives/obstructs the adoption of 
sustainable energy policies? 
 
The transition from fossil fuel to sustainable energy and selection of the low carbon 
technology tends to be a highly politicised process. Identifying those actors in 
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government, business or civil society that obstruct or drive the policy process is an 
essential part of our approach. The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the key 
insight from the recent political economy literature. 
 
There is now a substantial literature on why political economy analysis is needed and 
what adopting a political economy means in particular policy field. Amongst the most 
useful contributions are Department for International Development (2009), Williams, 
Duncan, Landell-Mills, and Unsworth (2008), Unsworth and Williams (2011) and Fritz, 
Kaiser and Levy (2009): 
 
An annotated bibliography of these and many other papers is available from the Policy 
Practice Library.22  
 
The question driving our political economy analysis is: Who obstructs/drives the adoption 
of specific sustainable energy policies in Kenya and Ghana? The energy sector in these 
countries is politically and institutionally complex, as is evident from the difficult history of 
power sector reform. Identifying the binding constraint and the most promising policy is 
essential but not sufficient for testing the practical relevance of our approach. Identifying 
the actors who (seek to) block or adopt the most suitable policy is equally important. This 
is what our political economy analysis is about. Pulling together what the literature tells us 
on this question is the purpose of this chapter. We will do this in two stages: first, distil the 
international literature and then concentrate on Africa. 
 
5.1 Lessons from the international literature 
 
Who drives renewable energy policies and who holds them back? There are many actors 
to be considered. Grouping them is essential to make sense of the literature. Table 5.1 
seeks to do this. It distinguishes between top down and bottom up approaches and 
between actors of different types, operating at different levels and in different locations. 
 
5.1.1 Categorising actors 
 
Over the last decade, the policy debate has given most attention to the left side of the 
table. The ambition was to bring economic development within planetary boundaries by 
pursuing an approach which was top down, had global scale, was (supposed to be) led by 
the North, and driven forward by public actors that recognised the need to mitigate climate 
change. This global governance approach has failed as shown by successive climate 
conferences (COPs) and the sustainability conferences in Rio de Janeiro (Latin 2012). In 
the meantime however, progress was made on the right side of the table: using bottom up 
approaches and relying on local initiatives in which civic actors play a major role (Leach 
and Scoones 2015). Local government has also played an important role – as shown by 
case material from both West and East (OECD 2010; Harrison and Kostka 2012). 
 
Table 5.1  Who drives renewable energy policy? 
 
Approach Top Down  Bottom Up 
Level Global National Local 
Location North Rising Powers South 
Actor Public Private Civic 
Motive Climate Change Energy Security New Industrial 
Sectors 
Green Jobs 
Source: Authors’ own 
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See www.thepolicypracticelibrary.com  
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Similarly, at the national level, substantial progress was made in some countries, with 
governments implementing green industrial/energy policies and the private sector making 
big investments in renewable energy and other low carbon technologies. Such progress 
made at the national level risks however running out of steam in the countries expected to 
lead the green transformation: most of Western Europe and North America is politically 
paralysed and financially constrained. The rising powers (China, India and Brazil) have 
become the default movers and shakers in the green transformation – in both the 
negative and positive sense. While responsible for the continuing growth of carbon 
emissions they are also the biggest investors in mitigation. Seen globally, China is 
number one investor in renewable energy and India has recorded high recent growth 
rates in 2011 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2013). 
 
Table 5.1 helps to categorise existing approaches and actors. On their own none of them 
will achieve the green transformation. Most observers would agree that the bottom up and 
top down approaches need to be combined and that multi-level governance is needed 
(Bulkeley and Newell 2010:3). But which forces can bring this about? 
 
Who can drive the required policies forward? Recent literature suggests that actors who 
believe in green causes cannot bring about the required advances on their own (Newell 
and Paterson 2011). Those with motives other than climate change need to be brought 
into the picture. Their main motives are included in the last line of Table 5.1. Schmitz 
(2015a) suggests that the analysis of actors and motives then needs to take four critical 
steps: first, recognise that no single actor has the resources to bring about the green 
transformation; second, recognise that within government, civil society and business there 
are actors seeking to block or slow down the green transformation. Third, attention needs 
to focus on supportive alliances across these categories. Fourth, including actors with 
different motives helps to understand and accelerate the green transformation. The 
transformative alliance becomes the central concept. Let us elaborate. 
 
5.1.2 Alliance of actors 
 
Bringing about green transformations requires resources of different types: expertise, 
money, organisational capacity, legitimacy and leadership. These resources tend to be 
distributed over a range of public, private and civic actors. It is therefore useful to 
concentrate on alliances between actors in government and business and civil society. 
 
Who then can be considered a member of such an alliance? Is the deciding criterion 
motivation or action? While it is tempting to let motivation count and opt for an alliance of 
the like-minded, this is a limiting step to take. There is a range of actors that can support 
the green transformation through their action (such as investing, providing expertise, 
lobbying) but their motive need not be to mitigate climate change; the main motive might 
be to secure energy, to build competitive green industries, or to foster green jobs – with 
climate change mitigation at best a ‘co-benefit’. In other words, there is a potential for 
alliances that include actors whose priority is not environmental sustainability. This can be 
a ‘game changer’ in the policy process. It is supported by historical research which shows 
actor groups with differing intentions advancing the change in a specific direction (WBGU 
2011:85). 
 
 Such alliances seem to have been important in both China and Europe. In Denmark, for 
example, the experimentation with wind energy received substantial support from 
politicians and business leaders concerned with energy security – in the wake of various 
oil crises. Actors with environmental motivations played a role at the start and increased 
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in importance over time but they were never sufficient. Actors motivated by the chance to 
build a globally competitive hub (for providing wind energy solutions and creating highly 
paid jobs) have played a big role. In China, such alliances were equally if not more 
relevant. China’s massive investment in renewable energy was not driven primarily by 
concerns with global climate change but by concerns to secure energy and ambitions to 
build new competitive sectors. These were major concerns in both Chinese government 
and industry (Schmitz 2015b). Add to this the more recent concern in urban society to 
reduce pollution – now openly acknowledged in the Chinese media. 
 
Recent research in China (Dai 2014) shows that such alignments of interest matter in 
both policy formulation and implementation. In China, policy formulation tends to take 
place at central level and implementation at local level. Dai (2014) stresses that the local 
take up of centrally designed policies varies enormously within China. ‘Dynamic’ localities 
which implement central policies for solar and wind energy are led by local government 
and often supported by business. These government and business actors have ambitions 
which are rarely about mitigating climate change; they are more concerned with 
promoting local economic development, creating jobs, increasing tax revenue (local 
government) and generating profit (business). 
 
The relevance of alliances is confirmed by the research of Harrison and Kostka (2012) on 
the local politics of climate change in China and India.  
 
In both countries the ability to build and sustain coalitions is central to the 
effectiveness and sustainability of climate change policy. For various reasons, 
state strategies in China and India have focused on the need to bring different 
parties with otherwise divergent interests on board to build a coalition in favour of 
climate mitigation measures.  
(Harrison and Kostka 2012: 5) 
 
Recent research in India (Chaudhary, Narain, Krishnan and Sagar 2014) shows that such 
coalitions have played a critical role also at the national level but that the combinations of 
interests varied between sectors. The solar industry was supported for the purpose of 
both securing energy and building competitive low carbon industries. The ‘National Solar 
Mission’ is the most visible symbol of an industrial policy for this sector. The most 
vigorous implementation of this policy occurred in the state of Gujarat where Chief 
Minister Narendra Modi (now Prime Minister of India) spearheaded an alliance of 
government and business interests determined to accelerate economic development. 
There is no equivalent ‘national wind mission’ in India indicating that concerns with 
building a competitive wind turbine industry played less of a role in policies supporting this 
sector (Chaudhary et al. 2014). Energy security was the main driver – on the part of 
government. Climate change mitigation was only a ‘co-benefit’ (Dubash, Raghunandan, 
Sant and Sreenivas 2013). 
 
To summarise, the composition of transformational alliances varies, depending on the 
specific policy or project or sector in question. Actors in these alliances might see climate 
change mitigation as a co-benefit but tend to have other priorities such as securing 
energy, building new competitive industries, creating new jobs in their region, raising 
public revenue or generating private profit. 
 
This is not to suggest that there are only winners. Some stand to lose, and in the early 
stages the losers might even outnumber the winners. Whatever the numbers, they are 
agents of resistance and they need to be analysed in the same way as the agents of 
change. The opponents also seek alliances. The opposing forces are not necessarily 
49 
 
against de-carbonisation as such but they are fighting for their jobs and/or protecting their 
assets which are tied to fossil fuel and related sectors. Geels (2014) provides a detailed 
political economy analysis of the UK electricity system and policy debate, unravelling the 
forces which block or resist the changes to renewable energy. 
 
To return to our overall argument, focusing on alliances is essential for understanding 
advances and setbacks in renewable energy policy formulation and implementation. Such 
alliances are best seen as vehicles for bundling diverse interests for a particular purpose, 
such as influencing legislation, policies, or projects. In order to be effective, analytical and 
political work needs to deal with both agents of change (prospective winners) and agents 
of resistance (prospective losers). 
 
Putting such alliances centre stage is a critical step for addressing our central question, 
but it is not sufficient. Two further steps are needed: first, we need to be able to 
distinguish between alliances of different types. At one end there is the strategic alliance 
based on joint action. At the other end there is the mere alignment of interest without co-
ordination between the parties. Both can be transitional (short term) or enduring (long 
term). All types can be instrumental in bringing about collective action or blocking it. 
 
Second, we need to ask where these alliances come from. They are not given but are in 
themselves a product of history. Lockwood (2014) shows that the policies adopted in one 
stage have knock-on effects for subsequent stages and influence the momentum of the 
policy debate. Depending on how these policies are designed and implemented they give 
rise to new stakeholders, for example business and workers who invested their money or 
careers in the deployment of green technologies. But these policies can also create a 
backlash from those who pay for the subsidised investments through increases taxes or 
energy bills. 
 
5.1.3 Business as Policy Actors 
 
The need to consider the full range of societal actors has been increasingly 
acknowledged in the European renewable energy policy debate. A clear example is the 
German Council for Global Change which stresses that the transition from fossil fuel to 
renewable energy is above all a political task. Central to this political task - according to 
the Council - is the forging of ‘A Social Contract for Sustainability’ (title of WBGU 2011), a 
contract between the state and the citizens. ‘The contract has to bring two important new 
protagonists into the equation: the self-organised civil society and the community of 
scientific experts’ (WBGU 2011: 8). Others put more explicit emphasis on including 
business actors in the policy process. Since this is central for our project, it deserves 
further elaboration. 
 
The focus on alliances and inclusion of business in such alliances finds strong support in 
the literature. Recent political science analysis shows that alliances (or coalitions) can be 
effective in overcoming complex collective action problems (Leftwich 2009; Peiffer 2012). 
Including business in the analysis and formation of alliances makes a significant 
difference. Maxfield (1991: 421) stressed long ago the critical role of policy coalitions 
which cut across state and society and include business. More recently, Abdel-Latif and 
Schmitz (2010) have shown why and how state-business alliances matter for overcoming 
bottlenecks in economic development. When it comes to green transformations, the 
inclusion of business seems particularly important. As stressed by Newell and Paterson 
(2011) ‘many capitalists and state elites, for a range of different reasons, now have a 
political and financial stake in the project of decarbonisation’ (p.41) … ‘short or medium 
term transitions to a low carbon economy will have to be supported (financially and 
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politically) by powerful fractions of capital with a stake in the success of such a project.’ 
(p.23).  
 
This is a key point. There are parts of the business community which are keen to support 
green policies but are in fact driven by ambitions in other fields, notably securing energy 
or building a competitive new industry. Understanding the political dynamics needs to 
include also those interests which are not green in themselves but support the green 
cause. Effective cooperation between public and private actors does not require that the 
players support renewables for the same reasons. On the contrary, the chance of 
cooperation achieving results increases dramatically if players with different motivations 
are brought into the picture. 
 
5.2 Insights from literature on South Africa 
 
There is a substantial literature on the political economy of energy policy in Africa. It 
covers ‘green’ issues (the push for renewable energy), ‘red’ issues (provision of energy 
for the poor) and ‘brown’ issues (expanding energy production (whatever the source), 
expanding the grid, and the pricing of energy). The latter has attracted most attention 
because the shortage of energy has been a major bottleneck to economic development. 
In this project, and hence this literature review, we are however more concerned with 
where the energy comes from, in particular the policies that aim to increase the share of 
renewables in the energy mix. Who drives or obstructs such policies? The country for 
which this question has received the most insightful attention is South Africa which is 
therefore the focus of this section. 
 
The South African case is most interesting because it provides insights on both the forces 
that hold back the transition to renewable energy and on the forces that (seek to) move it 
forward. The forces against emerge clearly from a number of sources, including Eberhard 
(2007), Baker (2012), Baker et al.(2014), Pegels (2014) and Morris and Martin (2014). For 
a long time South Africa has relied mainly on abundant coal reserves to produce 
electricity. Cheap and plentiful coal-generated energy was essential for its ‘minerals and 
energy complex’. Actors from business, government and trade unions had an interest in 
the competitiveness of this complex. They used their engagement in the policy making 
process to keep energy prices low and minimise the cost of supporting renewable energy. 
A key actor in this alliance was the energy supplier Eskom, a vertically integrated state-
owned monopoly, well connected to key government departments and energy-intensive 
companies. In the words of Baker et al. (2014): 
 
Given the strength of the incumbent regime in the form of the MEC (minerals and 
energy complex) that is so tied to and reliant upon the production of cheap fossil 
fuels and their distribution through a grid controlled by a virtually monopoly actor, 
opportunities for large-scale and widespread transitions (to renewables) are hard 
to discern. 
(Baker et al. 2014: 23) 
 
But ‘moments of crisis create opportunities for change’ (Baker et al. 2014: 23) and such a 
change towards renewables has emerged. Understanding why is critical. 
 
There are strong environmental reasons for raising the share of renewables in the energy-
mix of South Africa: its carbon emissions per capita are twice the global average. The 
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opportunities for bringing these down are very favourable as far as nature is concerned; 
the country has one of the world’s best solar resource areas (Pegels 2014).23 
 
However, the driving force pushing South Africa into renewable energy policies did not 
result from a commitment to reduce high carbon emissions and mitigate climate change. It 
was rather prompted by a crisis in the supply of electricity. 
 
The importance of achieving energy security was brutally put on the political 
agenda by an inability of Eskom to meet the new demands of a post-apartheid 
period of industrial growth and rapid electrification for the poorer, previously 
disadvantaged segments of South African society. The breakdown of Eskom’s 
generating capacity, transmission and distribution capacity and rapidly escalating 
electricity prices shook business and residential householders to the core. 
(Morris and Martin 2014: 82) 
 
The crisis loosened the grip of the ‘minerals and energy complex’ on the policy process 
but moves towards renewables continue to be contested. Morris and Martin (2014) 
unravel a struggle between two coalitions, one against and one in favour of renewables, 
splitting the public and the private sectors while civil society (trade unions and 
householder associations) remains undecided. On the government side, the coalition in 
favour consists of the newly created Department of Energy, the Treasury, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs, and parts of the Department of Trade and Industry; and private 
sector support comes from foreign based independent power producers and ancillary 
business professionals tied to their operations. This alliance is gaining influence over the 
policy process and creating a platform for a renewable energy path but the process has 
been messy. So as to cut through this complexity, Morris and Martin offer the following 
insights: 
 
- Support for renewables comes from a range of actors with different motives. 
 
- Alignments of such actors have driven the change to renewables. 
 
- The process has not been smooth, it has had considerable ups and downs. 
 
- The governance of the value chain of electricity generation and distribution helps 
to understand these ups and downs. 
 
- Distinguishing between different phases of the transition helps to make sense of 
the changes. 
 
5.3 Next steps 
 
These are the main insights on the question of who drives or obstructs policies for 
renewables in South Africa. As mentioned, there are other good political economy 
analyses not discussed here but these address different issues (for an overview see 
Barnett 2014). Their relevance for our question is only indirect because the problem 
constellations and actor constellations tend to differ with the question which one seeks to 
answer. 
 
                                                     
23
 Buying hydro electricity from Mozambique or DRC are complementary options.  
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The most prominent example of political economy analysis which is well developed but 
only of indirect relevance is that concerned with ‘power sector reform’ (Victor and Heller 
2007; Dubash and Williams 2011). It is primarily concerned with how to increase the 
supply of energy and how to lower the unit cost. The political economy analysis then 
informs who promotes or blocks the required restructuring and liberalisation. It is about 
‘reconfiguring the distribution of power between state and private actors and the balance 
of power within the state’ (Newell et al.2014). Understanding these power struggles 
provides important backdrop but does not provide the insights required for understanding 
the forces that promote or block the transition to renewables which is our main concern. 
The battle lines are different. However, the South Africa situation shows that the broader 
struggle over power sector reform can have indirect effects in that it opens up or closes 
down political spaces for accelerating the transition to renewables. As mentioned above, 
the unexpected shortage of energy and increase in prices undermined the legitimacy of 
the existing coal-based regime and provided a political opportunity for advancing the 
renewables agenda in South Africa. Morris and Martin (2014) give fascinating insights into 
how an alliance of actors was able to use this opportunity. 
 
The task for our project is to apply our main question (who drives or holds back the 
transition to renewables) to the cases of Kenya and Ghana – and to discern whether and 
how this influenced by ‘old’ power sector reform. There is some very useful literature on 
these countries (for example, Newell et al.2014; Byrne et al.2014, Bawakyillenuo 2009, 
2012), which will be considered in country studies as part of this project. 
 
Finally, in order to make the literature review directly relevant for our project, we need to 
give explicit attention to the issue of energy access. There is a good deal of material on 
energy access – why it is important, where the technical constraints lie, what the 
economic constraints are, what regulatory changes are needed, what grid configurations 
are most effective (Tenenbaum et al.2014); but there is little on the political obstacles. 
The political economy of low carbon energy access is surprisingly underdeveloped. The 
literature contains useful observations that the agenda on low carbon energy access is 
donor driven and that pro-poor energy projects do not receive priority attention in 
government decisions (Newell et al. 2014) but we need to go to deeper than that. Why is 
that the advances made in supplying energy and increasing renewables do not extend to 
more pro-poor access? Perhaps a partial explanation can be derived from our previous 
sections which showed that advances that have been made were driven in particular by 
the energy security lobby. This is a lobby consisting of government and business actors. 
One would expect them to be concerned mainly with securing on-grid energy for the 
nation and for particular industries. Spill over in terms of access to on-grid energy for the 
poor can occur but is unlikely to be a central concern for the energy security lobby. 
Access to off-grid electricity is even less a concern for those whose priority is energy 
security. Who then is likely to prioritise off-grid energy in particular for those in more 
remote regions? The most likely candidates are donor agencies, NGOs, local government 
agencies and makers/installers of the equipment. Whether and how alliances between 
them make a difference is something that will have to be ascertained through our own 
primary empirical work. 
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6 What are the macroeconomic impacts of 
an increase in renewable energy 
investment/capacity, and the reforms 
needed to bring this increase about? 
 
 
Increased investment in renewable energy and the public policies required to achieve it 
may have unintended effects on the economy. We can increase our understanding of 
these economy-wide repercussions through the adoption of a multi-sectoral general 
equilibrium approach that captures the input-output linkages between the energy sector 
and the rest of the economy, as well as those between production activity, household 
income and expenditure and government policy. 
 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models – aka applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
models – are widely used tools in energy and climate mitigation policy analysis. 
Applications range from short-run impact assessments of shocks to the energy system for 
particular countries to global long-run energy system scenario studies with a time horizon 
of multiple decades.24 
 
The main appeal of – and need for – a general equilibrium approach is that energy is an 
input to virtually every economic activity. Hence, changes in the energy sector ‘will ripple 
through multiple markets, with far larger consequences than energy’s small share of 
national income might suggest’ (Sue Wing, 2009). The unique advantage of the CGE 
approach over partial equilibrium (PE) approaches is its ability to incorporate these ‘ripple 
effects’ in a systematic manner. 
 
In contrast to PE approaches, CGE models consider all sectors in an economy 
simultaneously and take consistent account of economy-wide resource constraints, 
intersectoral intermediate input-output linkages and interactions between markets for 
goods and services on the one hand and primary factor markets including labour markets 
on the other. CGE models simulate the full circular flow of income in an economy from (i) 
income generation through productive activity, to (ii) the primary distribution of that 
income to workers, owners of productive capital, and recipients of the proceeds from land 
and other natural resource endowments, to (iii) the redistribution of that income through 
taxes and transfers, and to (iv) the use of that income for consumption and investment. 
 
In line with the purposes of the present project, the following selective literature review 
focuses on CGE applications concerned with the evaluation of low-carbon energy 
transition scenarios and their economy-wide impacts. Section 7.1 reviews the standard 
‘top down’ production function approach to the representation of energy use and power 
generation used in most energy-focused CGE studies. As simulation results based on this 
approach depend critically on a set of model parameters that govern the energy intensity 
of production and the substitutability among energy sources, section 7.2 reviews the 
existing empirical evidence on the size orders for these key parameters. This section also 
reflects on the proper interpretation of these empirical estimates in the presence of 
                                                     
24
 For a survey of energy-focused CGE studies up to the mid-1990s see Bhattacharyya (1996). For more recent overviews, 
see Sue Wing (2009) and Kemfert (2009) 
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binding non-technical barriers to the adoption of renewable technologies. Section 7.3 
looks at so-called hybrid ‘top-down bottom-up’ approaches to the representation of energy 
technologies in CGE models. These less common approaches aim to overcome the 
limitations of top-down models with a highly stylised specification of energy technology 
options through the incorporation of detailed bottom-up engineering information. Finally, 
section 7.4 provides a selective review of studies that explore low-carbon energy 
scenarios in a developing country context. 
 
6.1 Energy in Standard Top-Down CGE Models 
 
In standard multisectoral CGE models, technologies for the transformation of inputs into 
real outputs in a country or region are described by sectoral production functions. In 
energy-focused models of this type, technology specifications belonging to the generic 
class of KLEM (Capital (K), Labour, Energy, Materials) production functions are 
commonly employed to capture substitution possibilities among energy and-non-energy 
inputs and among different energy sources. In technical terms, the sectoral KLEM 
production functions typically take the form of nested multi-level functions with a (positive 
or zero) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) among inputs grouped together within the 
same nest. Figure 6.1 provides a schematic representation of the substitution hierarchy 
between different inputs in production in a typical top-down CGE model.25 
 
The share parameters of the sectoral KLEM production functions are calibrated26 in line 
with the empirically observed sectoral input cost shares for a benchmark year, so that the 
model solution replicates the observed input demand patterns for that year in the absence 
of exogenous shocks. In contrast, the parameters governing the substitutability among 
inputs in response to changes in relative input prices are free parameters that are set by 
the modeller on the basis of secondary econometric evidence or more or less educated 
guesses. 
 
                                                     
25
 See e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2004), Böhringer, Löschel and Rutherford (2009), Willenbockel and Hoa (2011). There 
are variations in the detailed specification of the KLEM nesting hierarchy across applied models in terms of complexity and 
the composition of the input aggregates. See van der Werf (2008) and Burniaux and Truong (2002) for a comparison of 
different upper-level nesting structures in models with a KLEM technology specification. For empirical tests of alternative 
nesting structures see section 3. 
26
 For a discussion of the general principles underlying the calibration of CGE models see Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley 
(2001). 
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Figure 6.1 Typical Nesting Structure of KLEM Production Functions 
 
 
 
 
Source: Willenbockel and Hoa (2011) based on Böhringer and Löschel (2004) 
 
In each sector, the production of a given output quantity requires non-energy inputs and a 
composite ‘value-added/energy’ composite in fixed proportions. In the case of sectors that 
use crude oil directly as an input (in particular the refined fuels industry and the chemical 
industry), crude oil inputs are also a fixed proportion of output. The value added/energy 
composite requires energy and primary factors in variable proportions. Required energy 
inputs in each sector are composed of electricity purchases from the electricity sector in 
the model and direct use of fossil fuels. At the bottom of the input substitution hierarchy, 
the sectoral production functions allow for imperfect substitutability between coal and a 
refined oil/gas composite, and between refined oil and natural gas. 
 
Echoing the standard representation of the power sector in the input-output blocs of social 
accounting matrices (SAMs) that constitute the main empirical data source for the 
calibration of CGE models, electricity generation and distribution is typically treated as a 
single production activity in top-down models. Correspondingly, in these models a 
transition towards a higher share of hydro, solar or wind in the power mix is represented 
in a highly stylised abstract form as a substitution of fossil fuel inputs by physical capital 
under the assumption of a continuous space of available technologies. 
 
The lack of explicit detail with regard to the characterisation of current and future 
technology options entails the danger that in the case of simulation scenarios involving 
large departures from the initial benchmark equilibrium may violate fundamental physical 
restrictions such as the conservation of matter and energy (Böhringer and Rutherford, 
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2008) or exceed other technical feasibility limits (McFarland, Reilly and Herzog, 2004; 
Hourcade, Jaccard, Bataille and Ghersi 2006; Bibas and Mejean 2012). Moreover, the 
lack of technological explicitness limits the ability of top-down models to incorporate 
detailed information on cost differentials among alternative energy technologies from 
engineering cost studies and to simulate technology-specific policy measures in a fully 
persuasive manner (Hourcade et al. 2006). 
 
In response to these limitations of conventional top-down CGE models, various 
approaches to the incorporation of detailed ‘bottom up’ information on energy technology 
options into a CGE modelling framework have emerged over the last decade. Such hybrid 
top-down bottom approaches are briefly reviewed in section 4. 
 
6.2 Empirical Estimates of Energy Substitution Elasticities 
 
Simulation results based on the KLEM approach depend critically on the elasticities of 
substitution27 between energy and non-energy inputs and among different energy sources 
employed at the various levels of the nesting hierarchy in Figure 6.1. 
 
Most econometric estimates focus on the elasticity of substitution between energy and 
capital. Koetse, de Groot and Florax (2008) provide a meta-analysis of pertinent empirical 
studies up to the mid-2000s. Van der Werf (2008) and Koesler and Schymura (2012) 
present more recent multi-country and multi-industry results. Stern (2009) conducts a 
meta-analysis of existing interfuel substitution elasticities. Van der Werf (2008) and 
Kemfert (1998) provide empirical tests of alternative KLEM production function nesting 
structures. 
 
While many CGE studies base their selection of values for the production function 
elasticity parameters on the empirical evidence - see Beckman, Hertel and Tyner (2011) 
for a recent articulated example – a widespread practice is to set substitution elasticities 
for the bottom nests in Figure 6.1 to unity in the absence of conclusive empirical 
evidence. Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley (2001) have labelled this common practice 
‘The Idiot’s Law of Elasticities’. 
 
A key point to be borne in mind for the present study is that empirical estimates will reflect 
existence of binding non-technical constraints to the adoption of renewable energy 
technologies – and are thus not invariant to policies aimed at relaxing these constraints. 
 
Or as Hourcade et al.(2006) put it, ‘(i)f the input substitution elasticities critical to 
technological response in TD models are estimated from historical data, there is no 
guarantee that the values for these parameters would remain valid in a future with 
ambitious policies for environmental improvement.’ 
 
6.3 Hybrid Top-Down Bottom-Up CGE Models 
 
In response to the limitations of conventional top-down CGE models mentioned in section 
6.1, various approaches to the incorporation of detailed ‘bottom up’ information on energy 
technology options into a CGE modelling framework have emerged over the last decade. 
These efforts to develop hybrid top-down bottom-up models are still in a state of infancy 
and face a range of challenges related to theoretical consistency, computational 
                                                     
27
 See Blackorby and Russell (1989) and Thompson (2006) for clarifications of the relation between alternative substitution 
elasticity concepts in multi-input production functions. 
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complexity and empirical validation (Hourcade et al. 2006). A major difficulty is the 
construction of databases which integrate macroeconomic data with engineering detail in 
a way that facilitates a straightforward transparent calibration of hybrid models. As Sue 
Wing (2008) has put it, ‘(t)he current state of the technical art in this regard is more a 
matter of judicious assumptions and careful, manual calibration than systematic, 
replicable procedures’. Despite further research efforts in this direction over the past few 
year, this assessment still applies today. 
 
Examples for the development and application of such hybrid top-down bottom-up models 
include inter alia McFarland, Reilly and Herzog (2004), Laitner and Hanson (2006), 
Böhringer and Löschel (2006), Sue Wing (2008), Böhringer and Rutherford (2008, 2013), 
Sassi et al.(2010), Boeters and Koornneef (2011), Lanz and Rausch (2011), Bibas and 
Mejean (2012), Okagawa et al.(2012) and Fortes et al.(2013). 
 
6.4 CGE-Based low-carbon transition scenario studies for developing 
countries 
 
6.4.1 Policies to support the transition to a low carbon growth path 
 
To achieve the transition to a low-carbon growth trajectory in market-based economies, 
relative prices between fossil fuels and low-carbon energy sources play a decisive role. It 
is critical that the fossil fuel prices faced by market participants reflect the long-run 
marginal social costs associated with GHG emissions in order to incentivise the required 
structural transformation of the energy system as well as to induce energy efficiency 
investments and shifts to less carbon-intense demand patterns (Willenbockel 2014). 
 
Correspondingly, the primary focus of CGE-based low-carbon energy transformation 
scenario studies is on policy reforms that directly trigger changes in the relative prices of 
high- and low-carbon energy alternatives, namely the reform of existing fossil fuel 
tax/subsidy systems, the introduction of a carbon tax or the implementation of a cap-and-
trade scheme.  
 
6.4.2 Economy-wide impacts 
 
Willenbockel and Hoa (2011) spell out the chains of causation through which the 
imposition of a carbon tax on fossil fuel use or the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies affect 
macro-economic outcomes. The immediate effect of such measures is a rise in the user 
prices for coal, refined fuels and electricity. On the production side, the price increases 
induce substitution effects between energy inputs and affect production costs and hence 
the supply prices of domestically produced commodities. On the household side these 
user price effects induce income and substitution effects in final consumption. 
 
As the real purchasing power of household incomes declines due to the price increases, 
the pure income effect reduces demand for all consumer goods unless the carbon tax 
revenue is redistributed to the household sector in the form of income transfers or tax 
cuts, while the pure substitution effect entails a marginal shift in demand from the goods 
subject to a relative price increase to other goods. The changes in the commodity 
composition of demand are associated with corresponding shifts in the domestic sectoral 
structure of production. In particular, the growth of fossil-fuel extraction sectors, energy-
intensive sectors and sectors closely linked to these industries along the value chain 
slows down relative to the baseline growth path, while production in other sectors 
expands compared to the baseline. This climate-policy-induced structural change is 
associated with intersectoral factor movement and changes in relative facto prices, the 
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directions of which depend primarily on factor intensity differentials between expanding 
and contracting sectors. 
 
The dynamic impacts on macroeconomic performance depend essentially on the 
assumptions on how the additional fiscal space, arising from carbon tax revenue or from 
cuts in fossil fuel subsidies funds released by the cut in subsidy flows, is used. The 
dynamic simulation analysis by Willembockel and Hoa (2011) suggests that if the 
increase in government savings is effectively channeled into additional productive 
investment and measures to foster the accelerated adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies, GDP growth and hence long-run aggregate real consumption may actually 
rise relative to the baseline path. In contrast, if the additional fiscal space is used to 
compensate households for the initial real income losses due to the price increases for 
energy and energy-intensive goods (e.g. via income support transfers or a cut in 
household taxes), initial reductions in household consumption growth after the 
implementation of the reform are lower, but GDP growth and future consumption 
possibilities will also be lower than under the accelerated investment scenario. 
 
The possibility of the emergence of a ‘double dividend’ in the form of additional economic 
growth on top of the environmental benefits associated with the transition to a less 
carbon-intensive growth path suggested by this analysis is also found in other pertinent 
CGE-based studies. For example, using a dynamic top-down CGE model for China, Chi, 
Guo, Zheng and Zhang (2014) consider the introduction of a carbon tax in combination 
with an investment-stimulating cut in enterprise income taxes and report an increase in 
GDP on the order of 3 per cent relative to the baseline path for a carbon tax scenario in 
which China’s annual CO2 emissions drop by around 11 percent below baseline.
28 
 
6.4.3 Distributional impacts 
 
While many CGE studies represent the household sector by single aggregate 
representative consumer per country, which precludes an analysis of inter-household 
distribution effects, a number of studies disaggregate households by income class or link 
the CGE model to a separate micro-simulation model to study distributional impacts.29 
 
The ultimate distributional incidence of a carbon tax or a cut in fossil fuel subsidies 
depends primarily on the shares of energy and energy-intense goods in household 
expenditure by income group, on the aforementioned indirect factor price effects, and –
again – on the use of the additional fiscal space generated by these policy reforms. The 
study by Willenbockel and Hoa (2011) may again serve to illustrate the point: In the 
absence of compensatory transfer payments, the middle-income groups in both urban 
and rural areas suffer marginally more during the implementation phase of the policy 
reform than households at the bottom and at the top end of the income distribution, 
because the energy shares in household expenditure are highest for the middle-income 
groups. 
 
Adverse impacts on poor households can be neutralised (or turned into pro-poor impacts) 
by using part of the government savings arising from the subsidy cut for compensating 
cash transfers. However, as indicated earlier, there is an intertemporal trade-off. Using 
the additional fiscal space instead to foster additional productive and more energy-
                                                     
28
 Another recent carbon tax simulation study for China that considers alternative tax revenue recycling scenarios is Lu, 
Tong and Liu (2010). 
2929
 See Boccanfuso, Estache and Savard (2011) and Ellis (2010) for recent surveys. 
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efficient investments may actually raise income and consumption for all households in the 
medium run. 
 
A further general point on the distributional impact of fossil fuel subsidy cuts is worth 
emphasising. Such subsidies in developing countries are commonly justified as a means 
to make modern energy services affordable to the poor, and their removal is widely seen 
to hurt poor households disproportionally. Fact is, however, that fuel subsidisation is a 
grossly inept instrument to target the poor. Using data for a sample of 20 developing 
countries, Arze del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012) show that on average across 
sample countries, households in the top income quintile receive 42.8 per cent of the 
benefits from fuel subsidies while the bottom quintile receives only 7.2 per cent. This 
implies that the average burden to government budgets of transferring one dollar to the 
poor quintile is a mindboggling $13.89, as nearly 93 per cent of the subsidy leak to the 
higher quintiles.30 
 
Willenbockel (2015) provides a critical review of the wider literature on the potential 
synergies between the promotion of access to low-carbon energy technologies and pro-
poor growth. 
 
6.5  Studies for Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The very few existing pertinent CGE studies for Sub-Saharan Africa to date focus almost 
exclusively on South Africa.31 Following earlier efforts by Pauw (2007), Kearney (2008) 
and Devarajan, Go, Robinson and Thierfelder (2009, 2011) use a comparative-static top-
down model to explore the impacts of various forms of carbon taxation on the South 
African economy. Their results suggest that a carbon tax which cuts CO2 emissions by 15 
percent is associated with a moderate GDP loss on the order of 0.2 percent and an 
aggregate welfare loss of 0.3 percent. If the carbon tax revenue is used to finance 
reductions in existing tax distortions, the aggregate welfare loss drops significantly. The 
study also analyses the potential interaction of a carbon tax with existing labour market 
rigidities and concludes that ‘if South Africa were able to remove some of the distortions in 
the labour market, the cost of carbon taxation would be negligible’. 
 
Alton, Davies, Hartley, Makrelov, Thurlow, and Ubogu.(2012) employ a dynamic CGE 
model with a detailed treatment of the energy sector and an explicit incorporation of 
renewable energy technologies (hydro, solar, wind) to simulate the economic impacts of a 
carbon tax that reduces annual emissions by 40 percent towards 2030 relative to baseline 
emissions. Real GDP is projected to drop by 1.2 per cent below the baseline path if the 
carbon tax revenue is used to finance a reduction in indirect sales taxes and by 0.7 per 
cent if carbon tax revenue is recycled through a reduction in corporate taxes, as the 
former primarily stimulates consumption while the latter primarily induces additional 
capital accumulation. 
 
                                                     
30
 The average figures mask even more extreme cases of bad policy targeting (taking the pro-poor motive for such 
subsidies at face value) that become apparent by looking at the disaggregated results for country groups and fuel types in 
Arze del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012: Table 12). E.g. in Africa, only 2.2 per cent of gasoline subsidies reach the 
bottom quintile, implying a budgetary burden of over $ 45 to transfer a single dollar to the poorest quintile through this 
instrument (Willenbockel 2014). 
31
 An exception is a study by Nwaobi (2004) for Nigeria. A number of CGE studies for Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. 
Willenbockel (2013) for Kenya and Uganda) analyse a prospective expansion of biofuels feedstock production. These 
studies focus on land use and food price implications and are not coverd by this review. Robinson, Willenbockel and 
Strzepek (2012) and World Bank (2010) analyse the impacts of climate change on hydropower generation potentials in 
Ethiopia and Ghana respectively within a dynamic CGE modelling framework. 
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None of the CGE simulation studies under review consider the impacts of a removal of 
non-price barriers to the adoption of economically viable low-carbon technology options 
that are the focus of the present study. 
 
 
 
7 Under what circumstances does 
increased on-grid renewable energy 
capacity translate into increased access 
and reliability of electricity supply?  
 
On a simplistic level, installation of additional on-grid renewable energy capacity 
increases the energy available to consumers. For non-variable and deterministic 
generation such as geothermal, the benefits can be assessed in a similar manner to 
conventional power generation (coal, gas, diesel and nuclear); hydro may be assessed in 
a similar way, apart from the fact that it may be necessary to account for seasonal 
constraints on energy production arising from finite water supply. 
 
However, assessing the benefit of variable renewables such as wind and solar in 
increased access to power and improved reliability is more complex, due to the 
dependence of available capacity on the statistics of resource availability at different sites 
at any point in time, as opposed to available capacity of conventional plant being primarily 
driven by mechanical availability. Combined with lack of cheap energy storage, this 
means that if there is a possibility of very low renewable resource at times of high demand 
the capacity contribution of wind or solar may be very limited even if its energy output 
over an extended period exhibits limited variability. 
 
In a developed world context, risk based generation adequacy studies have been 
common practice for many years. However, limited technical data on power system 
performance can make running such a study challenging. Further, it is important to 
understand the specific metrics which will be relevant to determine the extent to which 
additional renewable energy will increase access and reliability. i.e. who benefits from 
increased access? Is reliability defined as the number of power outages per person, or is 
it regionalised? Is the quality of electrical power important? Should urban access be 
improved or rural access? What are the in-country drivers? 
 
7.1 Power system reliability analysis 
 
Power system reliability analysis generally aims to make assessments of the proportion of 
time for which all electrical demand cannot be supplied by the power system, or of the 
amount of energy which is demanded by users and not supplied. The outturn of these 
quantities is of course uncertain, as generation availability is uncertain ahead of time (due 
to random variability in generator mechanical availability and renewable resource), as are 
demand (which is constantly fluctuating) and availability of the network (e.g. if a power 
line fails). All of these uncertainties must be modelled in the language of probability and, 
given appropriate probabilistic representation of demand plus mechanical and resource 
availability, plus a system model which can work out consequences in terms of 
unsupplied demand of a given demand/supply scenario, it is possible to evaluate how 
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likely different severities of shortfall events are. Usually results are expressed through 
summary statistics such as a probability-weighted average of the different possible supply 
shortfall outcomes, or as statements of how often events of a given severity occur in the 
long run. 
 
Data required for reliability analysis include demand and variable generation profiles 
(usually historic time series), conventional generating unit and network availability 
statistics, the necessary technical specifications of all components, plus the layout of the 
network including where supply and demand are connected. 
 
A good summary of basic issues and techniques may be found in Billinton and Allan’s 
classic textbook (1996). 
 
7.2 Previous research and consultancy work developing metrics of 
improved access as a result of improved renewable generation 
capacity 
 
There has been very little work in the power system reliability community specialised to 
developing country issues. Such technical analysis is mostly based on the paradigm that 
everyone gets all the supply they want almost all the time, which holds in systems such as 
Great Britain and the US. Presently, it may be in African systems that demand is explicitly 
restricted by available supply much more frequently. Hence while much of the usual 
model structures may carry across to an Africa context, rather different risk index outputs 
may be required. These might look at how many customers can be moved to higher 
quality of supply or given access at all, rather than looking at how much these resources 
improve further the already high quality supply which everyone enjoys in (for instance) 
Great Britain - i.e. specification of these indices should reflect the interests of the host 
countries rather than assumptions based on developed country contexts. Determination 
and application of these will be one of the main subjects of the engineering part of the 
Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa project. 
 
This limited existing literature is summarised in a previous review by one of the present 
authors (see Chapter 5.1 of Pueyo et al. [2013]) In international journals, the only two 
lines of work found were the PhD of M. Pandey (supervised by Roy Billinton at 
Saskatchewan in Canada) which looked at the Nepalese national system, and ongoing 
work at the University of Cape Town in South Africa led by Profs Trevor Gaunt and Ron 
Herman. 
 
The remainder of this section summarises reports arising from work in the international 
development community. This contains much important material about the issues which 
matter in countries such as Kenya or Ghana, but does not elaborate on technical risk 
modelling approaches to quantifying access to supply. 
 
The Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme at the World Bank has produced 
‘A New Multi-Tier Approach to Measuring Energy Access’ (ESMAP 2014). The key 
feature of this is that it correctly recognises that energy access is not a binary parameter, 
i.e. it is not the case that someone either has access or they do not. The multi-tier matrix 
divides customers into 6 tiers (0-5) according to the following features of their supply: 
Capacity, Duration, Reliability, Quality, Affordability, Legality and Health & Safety. Much 
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more information on the World Bank’s activities in energy access is available on 
ESMAPS’s energy access programme website32. 
 
The World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic project (Eberhard et al. 2011) 
provides a comprehensive overview of issues in increasing energy access in sub-Saharan 
Africa. One particular perspective to note is Rosnes and Vennemo (2008) which presents 
results from a least cost optimisation model for supply with respect to a country’s given 
demand. The model structure is given, and code is available online, but this does not go 
into detail of probabilistic assessment of supply reliability. 
 
A US National Renewable Energy Laboratory report (Cox,Katz and Würtenberger 2014) 
investigates carbon abatement resulting from different technologies with Kenya as a case 
study. This report however concentrates on carbon emissions for a given energy supply 
rather than enabling access to energy. 
 
7.3 General characteristics of Sub-Saharan African power systems 
 
The African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (2010) provides a good overview of Sub 
Saharan African power systems (not including South Africa): 
 
 The entire generation capacity of Sub-Saharan Africa is less than that of Spain. 
Having such a low generation capacity means there is a need for additional 
generation if something approaching universal access to on-grid energy is to be 
achieved, and a small investment in renewables can make a proportionally larger 
contribution to the power system. However, with a small installed capacity there 
are likely to be fewer generation plants with which to balance intermittent 
generation. 
 
 Average annual demand per capita is 124 kWh. Less than a quarter of the 
population has access to any electricity, and only 10 per cent of the bottom half of 
the income distribution have access. 
 
 On average, power outages occur 56 days per year in manufacturing enterprises, 
compared to the standard planning target of an average of one day every ten 
years in the USA. 
 
Table 7.1 provides a comparison between the UK, Kenyan and Ghanaian power systems. 
The general characteristics previously described are evident here. Both systems have 
significantly smaller installed capacities and demands than the UK, both in absolute terms 
and when the size of the grid relative to the population is considered. However, both have 
disproportionately large hydro generation which dominates the installed generating 
capacities (46.7 per cent and 52.5 per cent respectively in Kenya and Ghana), and 
provide the bulk of energy supply (53.3 per cent and 64.4 per cent). Losses in both 
systems are higher than in the UK, and further study would be interesting to understand 
the proportion of these which are technical (e.g. losses in transmission) or non-technical 
(energy used but not paid for). Both Kenya and Ghana have high electrification targets of 
100 per cent of the population connected by 2030, but of interest also is the quality of 
service and anticipated annual demand of various parts of the population. The latter is 
important in technical analysis for this project. 
 
                                                     
32
 /www.esmap.org/Energy_Access 
63 
 
Table 7.1  Comparison of the UK, Kenyan and Ghanaian power systems, 2013 
Parameter Units UK Kenya Ghana 
Population M 64.1 45.0 26.5 
Installed generating capacity GW 82.25 1.64 2.63 
Electricity consumption TWh 317 6.58 10.6 
 MWh/capita 4.95 0.15 0.40 
Electricity from fossils % of installed capacity 75.1% 43.6% 47.4% 
 TWh generated 229 2.11 4.64 
Electricity from hydro % of installed capacity 1.9% 46.7% 52.5% 
(not including pumped storage) TWh generated 4.70 4.30 8.23 
Electricity from other % of installed capacity 23.0% 9.6% 0.1% 
 TWh generated 123 1.61 0.003 
Imports/Exports TWh import (+ve) / export (-ve) 17.5 0.04 -0.10 
Losses (tech and non-tech) % of energy produced 15.1% 18.6% 17.8% 
Load factor  % 44.0% 45.8% 45.9% 
Electrification target (2020/2030) % n/a 65%/100% 100%/100% 
 
Sources: 
 Statistics for Ghana taken from http://energycom.gov.gh/files/ENERGY%20STATISTICS.pdf, valid end of 
December 2013. Dependable generation shown and losses are calculated as the difference between generated 
energy and consumed energy 
 Statistics for Kenya taken from www.kplc.co.ke/content/item/40/Annual-Reports valid end of June, 2013. Effective 
generation capacity shown. Operation statistics included for KenGen, independent power producers and 
emergency power producers but not for off-grid energy sources. Kenya’s population is sourced from the CIA 
World Factbook valid July 2014 
 UK data from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/337649/chapter_5.pdf valid 
end of December 2013. Northern Irish statistics are not included as these operate on a different electricity grid 
 
 
7.4 Information required for power systems reliability assessment 
 
As discussed above, it is as yet unclear precisely what reliability or access metrics will be 
appropriate in the Kenyan and Ghanaian context. However whatever metrics are used, 
similar data will be needed on supply, demand, balancing demand and supply, the 
transmission infrastructure and some additional risk factors. 
 
Supply data required includes a list of generating stations, including planned additions 
and anticipated requirements. Availability statistics are also required for each generator. 
For conventional units depending on the calculation to be performed this might be the 
probability of units being available at any point in time, or mean times to failure and repair. 
If there are significant risks of fuel supply interruptions, this may have to be taken into 
account also. For hydro stations there may be additional seasonal restrictions on the total 
energy generated, arising from a finite water supply. Thus appropriate historic data to 
assess the variability between years of water may also be needed. For renewables such 
as wind and solar, historic resource data (either metered output from existing installations, 
or meteorological data converted to generator output) will be needed to estimate future 
availability patterns. It is not yet clear what other data will be available in Kenya and 
Ghana, particularly with respect to renewable projects which are planned but have not yet 
been built. It will also be necessary to determine whether the same generic availability 
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statistics apply to all generating units of a given class. This will usually not be the case 
with renewables (wind or solar resource is strongly location dependent), but for 
conventional generation this should be considered on a case by case basis (it may be the 
case that all units of a given technology may be considered equivalent, or there might be 
particular knowledge suggesting that bespoke data should be used for each unit.). 
 
Demand data includes as a starting point a historic time series of demand, showing a 
representative range of current demand patterns. In the Kenyan and Ghanaian context, 
however, metered historic demand might not be representative of future needs even 
under an assumption of unchanging basic demand patterns, if the demand met is 
regularly constrained by available generation. It may therefore be necessary to assess 
patterns of total demand by means other than estimation based on historic data. Where 
demand curtailment is a regular feature of a system, information on the relative priorities 
given to meeting different tranches of demand will also be important, including whether 
there is a component of demand which must be met. 
 
Where there is particular interest in integrating variable output renewables such as wind 
and solar generation, it may also be necessary to assess whether the other plants on the 
system have the flexibility to meet the up- and down-ramps of net demand (i.e. demand 
minus renewables). This might include assessment of whether additional investment in 
flexible conventional technologies or hydro would allow greater take-up of renewables. 
 
In order to determine whether finite network capacity restricts the ability of renewables to 
deliver increased energy access, information on the capacities and other properties of the 
transmission lines is required. The most detailed results would be obtained from a 
modelling exercise considering every single transmission network element explicitly, 
however it may be possible to obtain meaningful results using a reduced model which 
divides the network into zones, with the only transfer constraints considered being 
between zones. It is also important to understand whether any network operational 
security measures (e.g. reducing transfer capacities between regions to improve 
resilience against sudden fault events) is significant in these assessments. 
 
Any additional country-specific risk factors (e.g. theft, supply chains for fuel, areas of 
political instability etc.) need to be identified and, to the extent that they meaningfully can 
be, quantified. 
 
These data requirements are summarised in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2  Data requirements for power systems analysis 
 
Element of the system Data 
Supply  List of generating stations including planned additions and anticipated 
retirements 
 Availability statistics for each generator 
Demand  Historic time series of demand 
 Estimates of supressed demand due to generation constraints 
 Relative priorities given to meeting difference tranches of demand 
Balancing supply and demand  Assessment of flexibility of the system to meet up and down ramps of net 
demand (demand minus renewables) 
 Estimate of balancing costs: new investments in flexible conventional 
technologies or hydro required to take up more intermittent renewables.  
Transmission infrastructure  Capacity and properties of transmission lines 
 Network operational security measures (e.g. reducing transfer capacities 
between regions to improve resilience against sudden fault events)  
Additional risk factors For example: theft, supply chains for fuel, areas of political instability etc 
Source: Authors’ own 
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8 Conclusions  
 
This literature review shows the state of the art on our research questions. This is the 
starting point of our research on Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa, which will target the 
gaps identified in the existing literature and apply our analysis to two specific countries: 
Kenya and Ghana. 
 
The first step of the analysis concerns the identification of promising renewable energy 
technologies, which are economically and financially feasible, but underinvested. Existing 
literature uses predominantly the LCOE to compare renewable generation options with 
fossil fuel alternatives. LCOE are useful for comparison of different generation sources 
but have a number of shortcomings. Because LCOE depend on a number of highly 
specific assumptions, they need to be estimated case by case to provide a real 
assessment of competitiveness. Also, they should be complemented with a measurement 
of financial viability that takes into account the actual cost of finance, an integral part of 
renewable energy project costs. Additionally, assessing the economic and financial 
viability of renewable generation technologies requires some judgement on what amount 
of policy and financial support is acceptable to maximise the economic returns to society. 
Inclusiveness of specific generation technologies requires an understanding of who will 
benefit from improved access to electricity as a result of further investment. All this points 
at the need for a clear methodology for policymakers to be able to target the most 
promising renewable energy technologies as regards economic and financial viability and 
inclusiveness in a particular location.  
 
Once the target renewable generation technologies are identified, we aim at unravelling 
what is holding back investment in these. Considerable research has looked at the 
obstacles to renewable energy investment in general, and in developing countries in 
particular. A wide range of obstacles – technical, economic, financial, institutional, political 
– are often cited, with suites of reforms recommended on all fronts. We identified two 
publications ranking constraints by looking at how different barriers and their associated 
risks have a differential impact on financing costs for specific countries and technologies. 
Their ranking was based on direct questioning to investors, not following a systematic and 
replicable approach that combines readily available data with stakeholders insights. This 
state of the art resembles historical research on boosting growth in developing countries. 
Again, a wide range of factors were cited, and far-reaching reforms proposed. This drove 
Hausmann et al. (2004) to develop the Growth Diagnostics approach arguing that there 
may be many reasons why an economy does not grow as fast as it could. Each reason 
will generate a distinctive set of ‘symptoms’ that can become the basis for a different 
diagnostic of the problem. The Growth Diagnostic framework uses a decision-tree 
framework to cut through this complexity, identify the binding constraints on growth, and 
then focus policy interventions in these areas. The growth diagnostics approach 
developed by Haussmann et al. (2004) has proven to be effective. We believe a similar 
approach could be developed as ‘Green Growth Diagnostics’. Developing a decision tree 
and applying it to investment in the renewable energy sector, rather than the national 
growth rate, is part of the next stage of this project. 
 
Our green growth diagnostics approach will not stop with the identification of the binding 
constraint and related policy mix. To have their predicted effect, policies need to be 
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implemented and evidence shows that whether or not policies that make economic and 
environmental sense are finally implemented is often a case of political feasibility. Our 
review of political economy analyses of who drives renewable energy policies and who 
holds them back suggests that actors who believe in green causes cannot bring about the 
required advances on their own (Newell and Paterson 2011). Those with motives other 
than climate change need to be brought into the picture. Their main motives can include 
energy security, industrial development, new employment opportunities or the provision of 
energy access for the poor. Alliances of actors with different motivations are required to 
bring about policies that drive the green transformation. Insights from literature on South 
Africa show that the incumbent regime reliant on capital accumulation through large scale 
mineral extraction, cheap fossil fuel based energy provision and associated downstream 
sectors blocked a widespread transition to renewable energy. However, as a result of a 
crisis in the supply of electricity all potential energy sources were put on the policy table, 
creating a platform in favour of policies that benefit investment in renewable energy. 
Political economy analysis specific to our target countries: Kenya and Ghana will be 
required to ascertain the chances of the most relevant renewable energy policies being 
implemented instead of alternative fossil fuel based generation such as cheap coal from 
South Africa or gas in Ghana. 
 
The next step in our analysis concerns the economy-wide repercussions of increased 
investments in renewable energy and the public policies required to achieve it. These 
economy-wide repercussions can be understood through the adoption of multi-sectoral 
general equilibrium models. Existing studies show that policies that change the relative 
prices of fossil fuels and low-carbon energy sources can lead to the emergence of a 
double dividend in the form of additional economic growth on top of the environmental 
benefits associated to renewable energy sources. Besides, if complemented with 
compensatory transfer payments for the poor, policies that increase the price of fossil 
fuels can have a pro-poor effect. None of the studies reviewed consider the impact of a 
removal of non-price barriers to the adoption of economically viable low-carbon 
technology options that are the focus of the present study and all CGE studies for Sub-
Saharan Africa to date focus almost exclusively on South Africa. These gaps in the 
literature justify the need for a new CGE analysis for our target countries Kenya and 
Ghana. 
 
Finally, an assessment of the inclusiveness of targeted renewable energy technologies 
requires an understanding of the link between both on and off-grid renewable energy 
capacity and access to electricity in developing countries. The link is straightforward for 
off-grid generation, but it is complex for variable renewables such as wind and solar 
integrated to the national grid. Power system reliability analysis is the tool traditionally 
used to make assessments of the proportion of time for which all electrical demand 
cannot be supplied by the power system, or of the amount of energy which is demanded 
by users and not supplied. However, power system reliability analysis is mostly based on 
the paradigm that everyone gets all the supply they want almost all the time, which does 
not hold in most Sub-Saharan African systems severely limited by available supply. The 
application of power systems reliability analysis to the African context requires the 
redefinition of metrics to assess if additional renewable energy will increase access and 
reliability. Rather than look at how much renewable energy resources may improve further 
already high quality supply (as in developed countries), model structures need to be 
defined with different risk index outputs such as the amount and quality of new additional 
access provided. Determination and application of these metrics will be one of the main 
subjects of the engineering part of the Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa project. 
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9 Appendix- Barriers to increased 
investment in renewable energies and 
related policies 
  
 Barriers Policies 
Economic and 
financial 
Higher cost than fossil fuels Increase the relative price of fossil fuels: 
 Carbon tax 
 Emissions trading 
High upfront investment required  Subsidies to upfront fixed capital expenditure 
Returns not large enough relative to 
risk 
 Guarantees from developed countries 
 Foreign exchange liquidity facilities 
Low returns relative to alternatives  Phase out fossil fuel subsidies 
 Premium tariffs for electricity generated from renewable 
sources 
Low prices of electricity  Phase out fossil fuel subsidies 
 Reform of pricing procedures to allow for cost recovery 
High cost of finance in developing 
countries due to country risk 
 Concessional or lower cost finance 
Non-payment risk  Counterparty guarantees by development banks for equity 
holders 
Capital scarcity for green 
infrastructure 
 Public seed equity capital 
 Non-concessional public loans 
 Partial loan guarantees 
Lack of scale  Pledge funds 
Regulatory and 
political 
Longevity and certainty of policy 
support 
 Policy insurance 
 Put options by official agencies 
 Co-investment with a multilateral or bilateral agency 
 Support for renewable energy policy design 
Transaction costs of obtaining 
permits and licenses 
 Establish a one-stop show for renewable energy permits 
 Streamline processes for permits 
Uncertain market access and prices  Feed-in-tariffs 
 PPA-based auctions or tendering processes 
Political risk  Political insurance 
Technical 
Technology risk for technologies 
that are immature or not yet proven 
in the country 
 Development of local technology standards 
 Con-investment through public-private funds for promising 
new technologies 
Uncertainty about size and cost of 
renewable resource 
 Public finance for the preparation of renewable resource 
assessments 
 Capacity building for the local preparation of resource 
assessments 
Inadequate transmission 
infrastructure 
 Financial support for national grid infrastructure 
development 
Lack of standards for the integration  Formulation of a grid code for new renewable energy 
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 Barriers Policies 
of intermittent, de-centralised 
renewable energy resources 
technologies 
Limited experience of the utility or 
grid operator with intermittent 
sources 
 Capacity building for grid management with intermittent 
generation for the grid operator 
Lack of local knowledge for project 
design, construction, operation and 
maintenance 
 Operational risk insurance 
 Technology transfer and capacity building programs  
 Support from skilled workforce 
Lack of local knowledge for financial 
structuring 
 Capacity building for the financial sector 
Problems with transport 
infrastructure  
 Public funds for infrastructure 
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